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ChAPTBR I. INTRODUCTION 
" . . .  th e  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e s  d e a l  v i t a  c o n s c i o u s  
human beings whose behavior is influenced by knowl­
edge, metaory, and expectation. ... It does not 
meaa that it is impossible to state valid laws of 
human behavior. It simply means that one of tiie 
variables to be included in the statement of social 
laws is the state of knowledge and the experience 
of the persons whose behavior the law purports to 
explain." 
Herbert Simon (1956) 
Utility tueory is utilized in virtually every facet of the disci­
pline of economics. It provides a theoretical basis from which opera­
tional hypotheses are derived and a myriad of models are constructed. 
Whether implicity or explicitly, utility theory provides a theoretical 
construct for analyzing the various problems present in a society wtiich 
values individual preferences. H- wever, in the current state of tae arts, 
its application is restricted to an assumed static knowledge set. 
In the following theoretical analysis, utility theory is extended and 
generalized so as to fit in a broader matrix of a theory of individual be­
havior which will be applicable to a variety of problems associated witn 
changing preferences. 
The received theory of consumer behavior assumes that preferences 
are given. For traditional uses, such as explaining consumer behavior in 
a market system, this present theory is quite sufficient, and questions 
as to preference formation are simply not relevant! Pnroughout history 
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mankiad. has struggled Just to laairvtairi bodily functions- Consequently 
there can be very little question of the direction of human endeavors 
when day-to-day existence is constantly in question. In a subsistence 
environment the meaning of personal freedom and choice deteriorates sub­
stantially compared with an. environment which provides a cornucopia above 
and beyond the basic necessities to sustadn life. Physiological needs, 
such as water, food, clothing, and shelter, are quite stable and subject 
to much less variation from learning experiences relative to the psycho­
logical exigencies which are generated once the former are fulfilled. In 
an affluent society when physical requirements become nearly guaranteed 
for everyone and constitute a comparatively small portion of total produce, 
the much more subjective psychological aspects of individual behavior be­
come the prime determinants of social activity and progress. 
As the range of economic activity expands—as society caanges from 
an essentially static environment as far as individual preferences are 
concerned—to a dynamic confluence of increased complexity and developing 
technologies, tne efficacy of products is continually altered cy changes 
in tne product set and the multiplicity of learning activities whicn 
occur. The capabilities of current economic theory are simply inadequate 
to deal witn many of the relevant questions Tdiich arise in this context. 
For example, utility theory does not include decision variables which 
are specifically designed to alter œie's information state. Th&t is, 
decisions to gsân additimal information concerning the mix of products 
available, the prices of products, their quality, and so forth, are not 
included. 
But learaing,, in, and of itself, is an economic activity which util-
Izsz 3. significant- every-growing portion of society's resources. In 
addition to the educational system, per se, corporations and other organi­
zations devote a substantial amount of their activity to the quest of 
knowledge and learning, to advertising to alter people's knowledge, to 
research and development to generate increased technological skills, and 
to activities simply to define and identify their current position and 
status relative to the markets in which they are operating. 
Questions of efficiency and optimality lose their conceptual clarity 
if learning is a central emphasis of society and a ma.jor influence on the 
welfare of the individual. When people are starving, the obvious criteria 
of efficiency is as much output as is possible weighted by personal pref­
erences witnin tne limited range of outputs possible. However, in an era 
when output has a large effect on further preference formation, efficiency 
cannot be so easily construed. 
Thus there is a clear necessity for extending utility theory. Pref­
erences are formed, shaped, and altered not only by the amount of goods 
and services but also by tne array, quality, complexity, and so on through 
the many facets wnich are conceptually effective on the decision processes 
of the individual. This effect on the satisfaction or "utility" of the 
individual is paramount to the explanation of individual behavior. 
In order to pursue sane of these questions further, the goal of this 
dissertation is to provide a meaningful step in the direction of adding to 
the scope and power of current economic theory in the area of individual 
behavior. The theoretical inquiry embraced will be essentially twofold: 
(l) to analyze the conditions and results of viewing the individual as 
having a choice among numerous activities in which he can engage, subject 
it 
to the various constraints aad conditions imposed upon him by his environ­
ment: and (2) to allov> within this theory of taaxioiizatioa, for learoiog 
to take place and for the consequences of such learning and changed opin­
ions on the activities which the individual pursues. 
This amounts to simply an extension of utility theory to a more ro­
bust analysis with the current utility analysis as a special case. Pref­
erences imply a knowledge set and this analysis eacplicity considers the 
formation of such knowledge and consequently permits analysis of preference 
change. The individual is viewed as possessing a set of drives which 
provides a hypothetical construct for the motivating force within the in­
dividual. These dri.ves can be satisfied by various activities wiich the 
individual is free to select subiect to the constraints ipposed by 
technology and society. Activities are partitioned into two categories: 
economic, those which require an exchange of goods and services; and non-
economic, those which do not. The essence of the approach to be developed 
can be more readily seen in the contrast between following schematic 
diagrams. In Figure 1.1 the current state of utility analysis is pre­
sented as a preference ordering over a set of given goods and services. 
In Figure 1.2 knowledge is shown as affecting dirLves which in turn 
determine the mix of economic and. noneconomlc activities. The knowledge 
set is altered by planned learning, or activities ^ ich were specifically 
designed by the individual to change his informaticxi state; incidental 
learning from one's own e^qierience and effects from the outside world; 
and planned teaching, learning which is a direct result of planned activ­
ities by outside agents to alter the informaticm state of the individual. 
Ordering 
Commodity Set 
Fig. 1.1 Traditional preference analysis. 
Planned 
Teaching 
Incidental 
Learning 
Goods and 
Services 
Knowledge Planned Learning 
Exogenous 
Factors 
Economic 
Activities 
Drives 
KoneccHiomic 
Activities 
Fig. 1.2. Schematic representation of learning knowledge, and 
drives on preferences. 
Since the analysis is an extension of current utility theory, the 
characteristics of market demand are not negated. Rather, Airther expla­
nation and evaluation of empirical phenomena, which traditiœial theory has 
not been sufficiently rich enough in scope to consider, will now be 
possible. 
The relevancy of the hypotheses and conclusions developed are not 
limited to one area of economics but, on the contrary, have nearly an 
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infxaite potential application. Consequently the exemplary applications 
presented here vill be limited to those aspects which were immediately 
apparent to the author and which were useful in illustrating the potential 
employment of the theory» Chapter II reviews the current state of utility 
literature. The generalized preference models developed in Chapter III 
will permit partieLL analysis of the value of knowledge change. Chapter V 
concludes this evaluation under the postulates and assumptions of the more 
general variable preference models which are developed in Chaç>ter IV. 
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CHAPTER II. UTILITY, 
PREmffiNCE, AND LEAEÎNING 
Utility theory has been a central tenet of economics ever since eco­
nomics has been the subject of acadetaic inquiry. The primary and over­
riding thesis of Adam Smith's Wealth of Mat ions > is that individuals are 
maximizers in their oim self-interest. Entrepreneurs maximize profits 
and individuals express their preferences in a free market^ and thus the 
"invisible guiding hand" allocates scarce resources aciong unlimited vants 
so as to maximize the wealth of a nation. 
After 200 years of successive application of Occam's razor, which 
removed sill the irrelevant post-lates,"^ utility theory today stands as a 
prime example of how to extract the minimum results from the minimum of 
p 
assumptions. The current state of utility theory can be summarized thus: 
if individuals have preferences over different commodity bundles, the sign 
of the substitutiMi effect of a price change will be negative. Put in 
this way the result seems almost trivial (see Johnson, 1958), but never-
^or excellent surveys of the development of utility theory see 
Stigler (1950), Blaug (196Ô), Chapters 8 and 9- Stigler's article is 
reprinted in Utility Theory: A Book of Readings, Alfred N. Page, editor, 
along with several other articles from Bentham to Samuelson. 
^The volume of literature in economics is commensurate with both the 
importance and the emphasis of utility theory in eccsiomics. The bibliography 
contains a listing of representative articles ^ ich is intended to cover 
fill phases of utility theory but not nearly intended to be exhaustive. 
Good survey articles include Houthakker (1961), which reviews utility and 
demand theory from 1959 to I96I. For more rigorous mathematical treatment 
of current utility theory see Uzawa (I960) and Chipman (196O). Articles 
which deal with utility over several time periods and scme^at broaden its 
scope would include Koopmans (I9b0) and Koopmans, Diamond, and Williamson 
(1964). 
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theless the theoretical structure—the product of years of development 
snd thcusbt—^provil^s eccMaomists with a substantial wealth of intuitive 
feel and insight and a knowledge of the actual capabilities of utility 
theory. 
In order to provide an explanation of market demand, for example, 
all that is necessary is to . postulate the existence of a preference ordering 
by the individual over the commodities i6ich are available. One does not 
need any further psychological analysis of why this preference ordering 
exists or how it csmie about. In other words, without access to informa­
tion such as the intensity of individual likes and dislikes among commod­
ity bundles, the economist can derive operational hypotheses which explain 
a certain range of eng)irical phenomena; he is also able to construct cri­
teria which have limited application to questions of social welfare and 
efficiency by merely knowing the general nature of individual preferences. 
Model 2.1 presents the traditional model of utility maximization for 
a given income and given prices. 
Model 2.1 
Maximize: 
U = U(x^, ..., x^) 
subject to: 
a 
M = Z P.x. 
i=l ?• ^ 
where M = money income and where U is a utility indicator with the property 
that U{x^, ..., x^) > U(xj, x^) if and only if the commodity bundle 
(x^, ..., x^) is preferred to (x£, x^),^ and usually U is assumed to 
^or conditions necessary for such a function to exist see Debreu in 
Thrall, Coosbs, and Davis (l95^). Ch. 11. 
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be continuous with defined first and second partial derivatives» The fol-
ecoAitions must hold for a regular constrained maximum to exist: 
auy/ 
y» *i ^i 
p. 
tt 
Z P-X. » M 
1=1 ^ 
If there is a small change in the price of commodity 1, dP^ > 0, 
then the Slutzky equation follows: 
where lU. i is the bordered Hessian determinate of the cofactor matrix of I ,Jl 
second oi-der partial derivatives. 
If i = j, the first term of ûhe Slutzky equation can easily be shown 
to "be negative, the substitution effect of a price change. The seccmd 
è*i 
term, x ^ „> is the Income effect and in general can "be either positive 1 g M 
or negative. Thus the central tenet of utility theory is that the effect 
of an income-compensated price change will be negative (equation l), and 
consequently an Income-compensated demand curve will.slope downward. 
^ X. \ X lu. I 
In spite of the séparent meagemess of this conclusion, the effort 
which has gone into extracting this conclusion from the minimum of assump­
tions—and consequently placing utility theory in a proper perspective in 
economics—has been enormous, and justifiably so in view of the vast appli­
cation of such theories of preference. Regardless of the amount of sqopli-
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cation of this very simple construction and the amount of literature asso­
ciated Tiitb. it^ the j^iiity and usefulness is noticeably short. For ex­
ample, suppose that the set of available products expands such that a new 
product very similar to others previously available is introduced. What 
effect will tMs have on demand? The above analysis provides no answer. 
What is the relation between the complex of commodities available and the 
income of the individual? Again the theory is silent. 
The abstract theorists of economic thou^t have long "been the object 
of criticism from those "institutioialists" %Ao feel that the abstract, 
simplified construction of utility theory omits much of lAat is relevant 
in the explanation of consumer behavior.^ Although their approach is 
often eloquent and stimulating criticism, unfortunately they have offered 
no alternative ansilysis which rigorously upgrades the failings of current 
theory. If institutions play a significant and relevant role in deter­
mining the course of society and the nature of its economic system, these 
aspects should be included in the theoretical analysis in a specific and 
rigorous manner. For example, many have argued that often prices cannot 
be divorced fran the nature of a -good itself or that economic theory is over­
ly simplified and man is something much more than, the cold, calculating 
2 homo oecoaomicus in^lied by economic theory. If this is true, then the 
relevant characteristics of the individuel.'s environment which impose 
these constraints should be included and clearly analyzed. Clearly eco-
^or example see Ayres (1962) for the general flavor of institutional 
critics. Viner (1925) presents the traditionalists' rebuttal. 
^See Veblen's Theory of the Leisure Class (1912) or Scitovsky (19^5)-
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nomic theory, and more specificadly utility theory, is a simplification 
of the forces operating in the economic systeok. Currently it is the 
best analysis available. Thus the institutionalists have often been exco­
riated for dealing in mysticism and failing to provide a better alternative» 
Nevertheless they have provided some food for thought in that the questions 
they have raised point out weaknesses and incapabilities of current eco­
nomic theory. 
In addition economists who have been actively engaged in marketing 
analysis and research are quick to point to the failings of modern utility 
theory.^ For example, Doyle (1968b) states, " the theory of consumer 
demand is seri(Xtsly inadequate. Ihe consumer is faced with conditions of 
supply which are dynamic; new products are appearing while old (mes dis­
appear or change. In this situation the assumptions that wants are static 
and uniformly perceived and that information requirements are simple, are 
clearly misleading." Further he states, "The most valuable contribution 
of behaviorsJ. science fis tha^ learning is accepted as a central feature 
of buying behavior. " In spite of this there have been few if any attempts 
to incorporate this learning process rigorously into the theory of con­
sumer behavior; rather an immense amount of correlation and experimentation 
have been undertaken without such a theory to provide the structure neces­
sary for meaningful analysis. 
Only recently have significant developments occurred in utility 
theory which extend and generalize utility theory so as to include some 
^For a review of the use of utility theory in attempts to evaluate 
the worth of advertising end other aspects of learning associated with 
market behavior, see Doyle ( 19b8b) and the myriad references cited therein. 
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of these failings.^ Kalman (I96&) generalized utility analysis to include 
the sivVÂavioii vticre prices influence prefereaces. More specifically, the 
implications of the assumption that the hi^er the price the better the 
quality are analyzed in the comparative statics of consumer d«aand theory 
using the Slutsky format. In essence, the article argues that preferences 
shift in specified manner with a change in price or that learning takes 
place so that the individual has an increase in knowledge with a change 
in prices in an unchanging way. While this is a step forward in general­
izing utility "theory, .the implicit sissumptions contained in ttie mathe­
matical development are quite resiirictive and not likely to hold except 
in rare situations. 
Specifically Kalman's assmçgrzxon is that for a preference indicator, 
U = U(q^, q^, P]^, ..., p^), > 0 for all i and > 0 for at 
least one i. In other words, if > 0 for wheat, and the price of 
wheat rises, it is assumed to be preferred. Intuitively this formulatiœ 
is intended to include the consumer's cognition of price and quality and 
^or other attempts to learning In a utility ttieory framework which 
take a stochastic approach to observed behavior, see especially the work 
by mathematical psychologists Luce (1959)# Suppes (1961), and Luce and 
Suppes in Luce, Bush, and Galanter (196$), Vol. III. The approach by 
Luce ^  differs both in principle and from the theoretical analysis 
pursued here, as the postulate is that a utility or preference function 
gives rise to stochastic behavior. The reason for this pi-inciple devia­
tion between the mathematical psychologists and the one to be developed 
here is that there is a difference in interest. Traditi<»ally psycho­
logists have been interested in -ihe individual aspects of learning and 
preference while the economists have been concerned with aggregate effects 
of individual units. Par reasons of measurement problems, a stochastic 
approach is necessary at the Indlvidustl level. However, for theoretical 
clarity and since this stochastic element of choice is not a central 
force at work, in aggregate relationships, the approach adopted here emits 
the random el«aents of behatvior- This portion of utility theory liter­
ature beginning with von Neumann-Morgenstem (19^>3) is reviewed in the 
Appendix to Ch. II. 
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hence preference. While this approximation to learning and changing pref-
ere?ic^ç may hold in a particular situation, it is indeed a limited and 
restrictive assumption. This article is indicative of the failure of 
those operating with utility theory to recognize that the specificati<xi 
of a preference ordering implies a certain state of knowledge as does 
specification of the product set and all other parameters which are im­
plicitly assumed in such a theoretical analysis. Any change in these 
parameters of the model represents new information and must be analyzed 
by the decision maker for the meaning and implications of this change. 
Suppose that the economy is a perfectly competitive one and-pric-es in one 
industry rise relative to all other prices. While this price increase 
could be the result of an increase in quality of the product, it could be 
due to many other factors 6is well, such as a change in the price of factors 
of production. Further, if the price of the commodity should fall relative 
to other commodities so that it is at its former level, does utility fall? 
It would seem unlikely. Thus a change in price may or may not represent a 
change in the queLLity of the product and it is quality changes rather than 
price changes which would be incorporated in a theory of consumer demand 
which allows for changing preferences. 
Another significant step in furthering the breadth of utility analysis 
was achieved by Lancaster (1966) in two articles •vdiere products are viewed 
as having characteristics which satisfy the wants and needs of individuals. 
In this sense, products are viewed as inputs possessing characteristics 
which are desired by the individual. This analysis amcmg other things 
significantly increases the ability of economic theory to distinguish among 
complements and substitutes and to a certain extent eissess the value of tech­
nological change to the consumer. In the following approach, more generalized 
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and more encompassing than Lancaster's somewhat similar conclusions are 
re2£±»eà> that it is the characteristics of econcsaic goocls aod 
services ^ ich are important to the individual. Lancaster assumes that 
individuals have preferences over the characteristics of the various 
products, whereas in Chapter III the individual is viewed as reducing 
drives by means of activities which require a certain bundle of commodi­
ties. ®ius, although, similar, the two ^ proaches are subtly different. 
!Rxe preponderance of psychological evidence is in favor of the more 
Gestalt approach of viewing preferences as dependent uptm the total activ­
ity rather than as isolated characteristics.^ As an extreme but illustra­
tive example consider a concert. The Lancaster analysis would imply that 
the individual had preferences over the tcme of the violins, the liiythm of 
the timpani, and so on, làiile the theoretical structure developed in 
Chapter III would view the individual as deriving satisfactiw from the 
total activity, the entire orchestra, the concert hall, the comfort of 
the seat, and so cm. 
Farther, Lancaster restricts his analysis to the assumption that the 
functional relatif» between products and characteristics is linear while 
the analysis below is not so restricted. As with Lancaster, an evalua­
tion of technological change is presented which includes a broader range 
of technical change than Lancaster's model is capable of handling. Also, 
the inclusion of an assumed constant knowledge set (albeit over character­
istics vis-a -vis commodities) eliminates a wealth of relevant economic 
problens wich can be discussed with the models developed here. 
^or example see Maslow and Mintz (1956) or Helson (196U), Ch. 6. 
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Aa&paoh (1966) analyzes the disutility associated with the effort of 
cbt2ir>lr>5 %Sditional informatioa about the utility afforded fcy different 
goods. This approach was also applied by Batmol and Quandt (196k) to firms 
and their usage of "rules of thumb" because of the cost associated vith 
gathering information. Anspach restricts the analysis by assuming that 
the individual obtains information about one product at a time. Kis ex­
tension of utility analysis to include effort remains in the utility format, 
and considerations of time constraints and learning over time are not con­
sidered. In other words, Anspach's article as well as Kalman's analysis 
are restrictively set in a situation idiich mi^t hold as time passes but 
are not sufficiently rich to allow for a more cŒ^lete felicific calculus 
by the individual. 
Becker (1965) presents a theory of the allocation of time. Becker 
argues that commodities have two relevant characteristics: the intrinsic 
utility of the coomodity and the tJ.me associated with the consumption of 
the commodity» Although never specifically menticmed, the description of 
such a "commodity" more closely resembles the description of an activity 
as ordinarily conceived. Again the approach is to view individuals as 
having "production" functicms producing leisure and income for the individ­
ual for which commodities are factors of producticm. Of course when the 
individual is viewed as a maximizing producer with some freedom of choice 
the distinction between firms and households for the most part vanishes. 
The advantages of including time constraint in the analysis of individ­
ual behavior are many, as the article explicitly points out. 
Becker's analysis is an important and relevant development for the 
theory of economic behavior. However, the approach is restrictive in that 
16 
only given ordinal preferences over commodities with an associated time 
uiiseiislcii sxi:ît- Tbe th^r^tical structiire developed below includes 
Becker's analysis as a very special case in a much, broader framework and 
further goes on to analyze the effects of learning experiences on the 
preferences of the decision-making unit. 
The forthcoming theoretical analysis includes all of the afore men­
tioned significant extensions of utility theory as well as the traditional 
theory of utility maximization of a given income as special csises. It is, 
then, an extension and generalization of consumer b^avior with a result­
ing much greater power to explain, anatlyze, and predict "behavior in situ­
ations which could not be handled within the traditional framework. Also 
the theory will lend itself to the development of criteria of efficiency 
and welfare which was previously not ]^ssible. 
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CHAFFER III. GENERALIZED 
PREFERENCE MODEL 
"Science is, I believe, nothing but trained and organized common 
sense, differing from the latter only as a veteran may differ from a raw 
recruit: and its methods differ from those of common sense only so far as 
the guardsman's cut and thrust differ from the manner in lAlch a savage 
wields his club."^ 
If Huxley is correct, this implies that common sense in turn is 
nothing but a rough form of scientific calculation. Common sense involves 
one's deciding how the environment affects him and then also how he can 
best adapt to this environment so as to fulfill his needs as he sees them. 
Indeed, this is how rationality is defined; acting in a manner which will 
best achieve a myriad of goals. 
2 Hiis assun^tion of the rationality of man will be adopted here. It 
will be assumed that the individual can consciously calculate and carry out 
plans formulated in light of his environment so that the result is an 
atteânment of desirable goals subject to the constraints upcm. the individ­
ual. The person, typified by the paradigmatic approach developed below, 
has seme freedom of choice to select variables in such a manner that he 
achieves a constrained maximum. The genuine interest in such an approach 
is a specification and delineaticm of the nature of the quantity maximized, 
the variables, the constraints, and the consegient effect upon economic 
activity. 
^%omas Huxley, Weiner, 1955* p. 130. quoted in Ackoff (1962), p. 
%his should not be confused with the connotations of the often-used 
"rational 'econanic' man." 
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The procedure will be to develop a series of models, rigorously 
specified mathematicallywith a discussion and aa iaterpretation of 
the special coaditioos and implications associated with each model. This 
will provide a ïbecessary first step toward the development of a general 
analysis of changes in the knowledge set by expanding the view that an 
individual has preferences over commodities to one where preferences are 
embedded in a more general matrix of all possible activities and actions. 
This permits, within the theoretical structure, for the individual to 
select activities \àiich are designed to alter his preference ordering, 
i.e., information gathering activities. 3iis will be developed in Chapter 
IV. However, the models of the individual calculus in this chapter will 
be limited to a comparative static analysis of this expanded format for 
individueuL preferences. 
Model 3.1 is the full generalization of a nonlinear programming 
approach to the maximizing process in the static sense, (x^, ..., x^) 
represents the variables under the control of the maximizing unit, and 
equatiais g^(x^, ..., x^), g^(x^, ..., x^) are the constraints the 
maximizing unit must obey. The data variables are parameters in the 
maximizing and constraint equations. 
Model 3.1 
Maximize: 
(1) S = s(x^, • • «, x^) 
subject to: 
®1^*1 > • • • > 
(2) 
gmW' ' V 
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Ttie Lagrsuageaa eqa&tlGZ is: 
\ ss 8(x2f •••> **•# + • • » "^ »•»> 
Tiie Kuhn-Tttciter coadltioas^ for a maxioDuœ are: 
X • J. • 
^ < 0 , if < 0, then x = 0 
^ T °  '  
kX ' _ &X 
> 0 , if -yv • > 0» then X = 0 
— ' *X ' m 
or that X = X. -v^- = 0, for all i and. j. 
X qX^ J O ^ J 
Interpreting Model 3.1 in terms of Model 2.1, equation 1 is the 
utility function or preference indicator and the only constraint (equa­
tion 2) is that money income is equal to the total value of goods and 
services purchased, i.e., 
n 
£ P.x. = M. 
i=l ^  ^  
All that remains for the development of any static theory of con­
sumer behavior is to specify and interpret the completely general nature 
of Model 3.1 in a relevant manner 'which will lead to useful insists and 
operational hypotheses. 
^See Kuhn and Tucker, "Ncm-linear Programming, " in Nejman (1951). 
20 
The first step is a specification of the objective function. The 
baste of this thesis is to view the eoaeumer as possessing a set of 
psychological drives. Andthe sole motivating force within the individual 
is to reduce these drives» In other words, from equation 1 of Model ).l, 
S will be interpreted as the amount of drive reduction obtains!le and 
as the variables under the control of the individual. 
While this assumption smacks of restrictive characteristics (especial­
ly to the economist nurtured in individualism and aware of the admcmitions 
of using overly restrictive postulates which are generated with the histor­
ical account of Occam's razor slicing sway at utility theory), it never­
theless corresponds with current work done by psychologists in the area of 
motivation, satisfaction, and learning and will therefore be useful in 
Chester IV where learning and variable preferences are introduced.^ 
This specific assumption is incorporated into the model because it 
does add significant scope and power which would otherwise not be possible. 
Concomitantly, however, many of the results can be established with a more 
general formulation where the basic motivation-choice function is not pre­
supposed to contain the specific welfare implications of a drive reduction 
format. Specifically, a necessary and sufficient assumption for the 
models developed in this chapter is that the individual posses a binary 
is basic approach supported by a large number of psychologists is 
one of hedonism ïAich suggests that animals behave and leam because of 
bodily needs. In general the various theories of learning can l>e segre­
gated into drive reductlw theory expounded by Hull (194)) and further 
developed by others, especially Dollard and Miller (1950), and a cogni­
tive theory of learning (for exmmple, Lewin (igb?) and ToLnan (ly55))-
Althou^ this chapter utilizes the terminology of drive reduction theories 
of motivation and learning as a basic hypothetical construct, the models 
developed here and the variable preference models in Chapter IV are 
sufficiently general to be compatible with the specifics of either. 
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preference ordering over all choice varial>les which has the usual axio-
properties of completeness, reflexivensss, and transitivity. This 
logically implies the existence of a functrlorv S, such that S(x) > S(x*) 
if and only if x is preferred or Indifferent to x' and furthermore S is 
unique up to any monotonie transformation. That is, one can abstract from 
the language of drives and drive reduction and remains in the theoretical 
format. The welfare implications of a more unique function ^ ich has mean­
ingful cardinal properties are, among others, (l) the cardinal nxuober has 
a meaningful "intensity of feeling" interpretation, and (2) this represents 
me possible cardinal criterion on lAich to "base social policy. 
The maximizing behavior on the part of_ the individual with a cardinal 
objective function eissumes that he can mesisure the change in drive status 
in a quantitative sense and compare this with the change in another drive 
in like units, i.e., S = 0(x^, x^) \diere the x's are variables the 
individual can control. Thus let D - set of finite drives, and assume 
some function ^  megs the set of drives onto the real line, and m^s 
the set of activities into the set of drives •which changes the level of 
the various drives. Since 0 is a measure of dz*ive reducticxi, 0 is a 
composite ftmcticn with a constant of the initial drive level, 6^, i.e., 
0 - (0* .r) - . 
This implies tlizb the maximization criterioi^ S, is independent of the 
origin and a numerical measur^sent of drives is unique up to a positive 
linear transforation, i.e.. 
Let; r' =«•' + P , 
then S = (g' - . 
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Furthermore it is assumed that the unit of measure, «, can be meaningfully 
CQmp^ r^ed among persons in terms of empirical observaticHi» Ttiat is,, it is 
meaningful to say that individual i relative to individual j is twice as 
motivated in terms of the value of S such that if i will spend one hour 
writing to his congressman, J will spend only a half an hour. 
Drive reduction is postulated as resulting directly from engaging in 
activities, the arguments of the objective function. That is, those vari­
ables imich can be manipulated by the maximizing unit are a more general 
concept, namely activities, which are meant to correspond theoretically 
to the general range of individual actions. The activity set is partitioned 
into two subsets, economic and noneconomic activities. Economic activities 
are defined as those ^ ich entail the exchange of goods and/or services. 
This activity set is construed to be sufficiently classified so as to 
separately include all activities which has a differentiating character­
istic from another activity. Each good or service would, in general, affect 
more than one activity and, in general, each activity would be serviced by 
more than one good or service. 
Immediately a few aspects of this approach should be noted. Firstly, 
given a classification of the various drives, each and any activity could 
be quantatively evaluated as to its drive-reducing effects. In the final 
analysis, of course, the precise measurement of the drive reduction value 
of any particular activity would be up to the subjective calculation of 
the individual. However, it would also seem that an approximation would 
be possible on objective criteria established by past e%^)eriences and 
psychological measurement. Thus, given past information of an individual 
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or an. aggregate of such individuals;, an atjgregative evaluation of the 
i^erth. of activities would be possible providing some iaterp<?rsx?n.«tl 
weighting scheme were constructed. Thus, in some senses S would be 
analogous to a cardinal utility function. This is not to say that it 
would be a meaningful method of making interpersonal comparisons, but it 
would be a criterion.^ 
Secondly» the class of activities, when defined in rather general 
terms would tend to be much more stable than the complex of commodities 
which fulfills these activities^ For example, activities such as con­
sumption and entertainment would tend to remain constant over the life­
time of the individual relative to the products which fulfill them. Also, 
the demand for an activity such as transportation would tend to be much 
more stable than the cars, trains, or airplanes which change over time to 
fulfill this particular desired activity. 
The models developed in this analysis are not intended to explain 
the individual's psychological state. Attention is devoted solely to 
those activities and commodities ^rfiich are consciously considered by the 
individual. This is not to say that dreams, fantasies, delusions, various 
involuntary actions, and other forms of autistic behavior are igo^f^-ed, 
.lust that the anstlysis does not attempt to é^lain such behavior. From 
an economic standpoint these aspects can be assumed away from several 
cases: (l) the effect of unconscious (or involuntary) behavior on economic 
^t is woithwile to reoBember that the assumption of cardinality was 
dropped from economic theory not so much because no one had any hope of 
ever quantitatively measuring utility but because it was superfluous to 
the logical implications of demand theory. Its reincarnation here in a 
someiAat disguised form of "drive reduction" is necessary and useful in 
applications of learning theory as well as other relevant economic 
problems of present-day society. 
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activity is relatively unimportant vis-a-vis a rational felicific calculus; 
(2) tkese raacLcz, effects viil out in an aggregate empiricaJ. applica­
tion; or (5) idealistically, people will conform to the actions as predicted 
by the "rational" aspects of their psyche as they become m.Qre and more 
aware of their environment. Socially programmed behavior, such as rituals, 
ceremonies, pastimes, maneuvers, and games, is implicitly incorporated in 
the model as aspects of the individual's decision process, but the aggregate 
implications are ignored. 
The consumer is assumed to maximize his overall welfare as best he 
can at any point in time, that is, maximize F S dt, where the maximizing 
function used in the models is a translation of this overall calculus to 
a more easily measureable or more easily manageable equation, max. S = 
0(x^, ..., x^) at time t, which is the condition that must hold for all t 
in order that overall welfare is maximized. S = 0(x^, .x^) is a neces-
r 
sary point on the path at time t in order to maximize I S dt. In the 
o 
calculus occurring at time t all parameters and values in the maximizing 
function and the constraint functions are assumed to be converted to time 
t values and parameters.^ The intuitive interpretation of this assumption 
is that the individual is capable of discounting and evaluating activities 
which last for a considerable period of time if they are known with suffic­
ient certainty. For example the purchase of an automobile or other durable 
good would be done with consideration of the lifetime of transportation or 
other service the durable commodity would yield. On the other hand, activ­
ities such as buying and eating lunch two weeks in the future would carry 
^See Pontryagin (1962). 
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such a high discouat as to give it a zero value ia the objective function.. 
In general, it is possible that several paths, each with different charac-= 
teristics at time t, would result ia overall welfare maximizatioa goal. 
Ia this case the individual would be indifferent among the various optimal 
solutions. 
With the addition of specified learning activities introduced in 
Chapter IV, the individual is viewed as continually serarching for the 
optimal path and recalciilating the characteristics of this path whenever 
sufficient informatitm makes such a re-evaluation necessary. In the 
constant preference models one could calculate his entire lifetime of 
activities once and for all. In a comparative static sense, he would 
recalculate only when there occurred an exogenous change in the data. In 
the more general variable preference model, activities specifically de­
signed to alter the data (for example search activities), deliberate at­
tempts to convince others of one's point of view, and so forth, are in­
cluded. 
Thus activities chosen at any point in time me^ be of various time 
duration. Some, such as purchasing an automobile for example, are made 
with concern for a longer period to time than are others, such as buying 
a hamburger. This difference in time duraticm is subsumed into the dis­
counting process, i.e., the converting of all values occurring at time ^  
t to time t values. Thus everything, regardless of its time of occurrence 
or its duration, is converted to one point in time. 
Similarly at any point in time, the consumer, rxpcm selection of an 
optimal activity mix, concomitantly selects an optimal commodity mix as 
well. The function which maps commodities onto activities is solely con­
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cerned with those which are necessarily involved in a transaction^ the 
act of exchan&e. In other vords, given no initial wealth» sleep 
mi^t be an economic activity which would perhaps entail an exchange of 
labor for a bed. At a subsequent period of recalculation the same desired 
activity, (sleep), would not require another bed to be purchased and thus 
no concomitant activity of exchange would be necessary in light of accu­
mulated wealth (the bed). 
OO 
In the overall calculus of welfare, ^  S dt, the activities chosen 
o 
throughout this period, w. . (where t_ is the time the activity com-
i 
mences and t^ is the time the activity is concluded), would depend upon 
both the trade undertaken during the period t^ - t^ and the stock of 
commodities on hand throughout the period, i.e., 
i^ tQt^  i^,toti^ l^,tot^ ' ' *k,tQtp' l,tQ^ t.' ' \,tQ^ t^  ^
\Aiere x_ . . represents an amount of x, traded during t^ - t., and 
' 0, i 0 1 
X represents the stock of the commodity caa hand during t^ - t . Hie 
^'•'0 i 
relation between these stocks and flows and the optimal stock accumulation 
from the point of view of the consumer are not relevant for the purposes 
of Model 5.2. In Model 3-2 the stocks X^, X^ are absorbed as para­
meters in the equations, and the time subscripts are omitted for purposes 
of clarity. 
For the individual the consumption of a free good would not be an 
econcsaic activity. If the particular activity entailed use of a public 
good or a good which was partially public and partially private, no partic­
ular problem is posed for the model. In each case the calculus would be in 
light of the information possessed by the individual and his expectaticxis. 
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Suppose that a particular good in, question were a Samuelsoaian pure public 
wiisrs ccscusptic:» CG^l restricted by ownership. la this case the 
cost to the individual would be P/n, lAiere n is the number of people will­
ing to combine to make the purchase, P. In this case the calculus migtit 
dictate that it would be beneficial to the individual to proceed %rith the 
noneconomic activity of convincing others of the worth of the public good> 
and thus increase n and lower the price ^ xich he has to pay, P/n. %e 
point here is that whether the good is purely private, purely public, or 
some combination, it poses no particular problem for the analysis; the 
acquisition of products in the models need not be physical in nature but 
more generally should be considered as the acquisition of the ownership or 
ri^ts to the activity value of the good or service. 
Model 5.2 represents a rigorous extensicai of utility theory and con­
sumer behavior to include a simultaneous consideration of activities and 
the consequent product demand. It is a generalization of the conventional 
utility maximization approach to consumer behavior and meurket demand 
theory. It is not intended to replace utility theory in the areas where 
utility theory is quite adequate, viz., static market demand derivation 
under perfect information. Following the basic presentation of Model 5.2, 
conventional demand theory is worked out demonstrating that this approach 
in no way negates the utility approach but that indeed utility analysis is 
a special case. The primary intent of 3*2 is not to generate hypotheses 
and ccsiclusions but to develop an expanded theoretical structure, vhere 
the conventionsQ. analysis is a valid but special cstse. The scope and 
power of 5'2 will be beneficial in proceeding oa to larger problems in 
individusLl and group behavior. 
2Ô 
On page 52 the basic formulation In mathematical symbols Is set forth. 
In. (l) S* is defined as a set of basic drives; (2) assumes that the indi­
vidual can evaluate these drives; (5) and similar symbolic presentations 
are to be read as " f is a function which maps S* onto R. " These drives 
may be reduced or enhanced by the various activities undertaken by the 
individual. Some activities may enhance drives irixile others reduce drives. 
It will be assumed that the individual is continually trying to maximize 
drive reduction. 
Whether or not these drives can actually be measured and coo^ared 
(say, by a psychologist) is not in question here. The assumption is that 
the individual can compare the drive reduction from one activity with that 
from another and base his decisions on those values. That is, the actions 
of an individual can best be described as if he did a similar form of 
calculation, implicity or explicitly. For further uses of this theory in 
empirical application, it is postulated that it is possible to construct 
a numerical measure of drive reductlcm. ^ The debate as to whether or not 
this measurement of drive reduction would be equivalent to the welfare of 
the individual is indeed a moot one. Such a measurement would be expected 
to provide a cardinal measure of empiriceO. observations of intensity of 
preference and motivation. As to whether this is lAiat is meant by welfare 
is an opinion and, in the final analysis, is a value judgment to be made 
by the individual. However, there is a certain distincticm between moti­
vation as expressed by the value of S and to lAat would in general corres­
pond to welfare. For example, many needs or deprivaticoal states never 
^or the theoretical development of such measurement problems see 
Sup^s and Zinnes in Luce, Bush, and Galanter (1963), Vol. I, Ch. 1, pp. 
1-76. 
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result in. drive creation. There are no sense receptors sensitive to these 
dLepriYst 1 cazsl states; th>>ç there can be no arousal of tcie hypothalamic 
centers and no efferent impulses producing internal responses. Carbon 
monoxide, for example, produces no motivation for the individual to ob­
tain purer air. In a state of ignorance the individual would place a 
low value on purer air lAen in fact his very existence depends upon it. 
Is the individual the best judge of his welfare? 
Within the set of all possible activities, ()), there are a set of 
knovn activities, (4), the relation between (5) and (h) being a "knowledge" 
function (IT). For Model $.2 assume that for any point w^ £ W* the fUnc-
ticxi K either maps this point into an analogous point in W* or to the 
point 0 a null set, depending upon wiiether or not it is a "known" activ­
ity, with the property that W (0) = 0. The variables of K wiiich deter­
mine whether an activity is known or not are assumed to be constant for 
this model. Hence the "known" set of possible activities is invariant 
under Model 5-2. Also contained in this knowledge set are the various 
fUncticmal relations in the model lAich are also assumed constant. 
Known activities are partitioned into subsets of economic activities, 
those which necessitate the exchange of econcsnic commodities, and aoneccn-
nomic activities. The concept of an activity is an aggregate of actions 
on the part of the individual which he views singularly. For example, 
consider eating as an activity. There are various ways in which this 
could be fulfilled, for example by going out to a restaurant, by going to 
a grocery store purchasing the food and cooking it at home, or by dropping 
in on friends at UKal time. By classifying all these examples as serv­
icing a single activity, it is implicitly assumed that there are no 
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quality cLiffereaces among them.. Similarly each of these different methods 
cf servicins t-iie activity concomitantly imply a certain money ea^nditure 
and a use of time. Alternatively to this example, each method of eating 
could have been classified as an activity if the individual believes that 
there vas a quality difference among them. In this case the commodities 
vhich would sei-vice the activity of eating out> for example* would he the 
various restaurants, each with a different service and a different required 
time usuage. 
Ncmeconomic activities are identical to economic activities in intu­
itive interpretation except that they do not require the exchange of com­
modities. Again this is an aggregate of personal actions which the 
individual perceives or thinks of as being a single item. For example, 
consider the noneconomlc activity of recreation by being outdoors. Here 
the only cost to the individual is the opportunity cost of the time spent. 
Another example would be the decision to persuade a group of voters to 
vote in favor of a particular proposal. At any point in time the indi-
vldu£tl has an assumed relation between the time expended in argumentation 
and the consequent results. Again the cost involved is the drive enhance­
ment, if arguing is not a preferred activity, plus the opportunity cost of 
the time used. If the activity of persuasicm gave the individual drive 
reduction in and of itself, then the cost would be the time used as valued 
by its shadow drive reduction price minus the drive reduction from the act 
of debating. Equatitm 8 states that the individual can evaluate different 
activity levels. Equation 9/ the set of all conceivable commodities is 
related to known commodities, 10, by a knowledge function, A , as stated 
in l8. The properties of l8 will be assumed to be identical to those of 
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lï as discussed above. Thus the set of known commodities is also constant 
for Mo<iç.î 
Equation 12 is a given price vector over which the individual has no 
influence. In applying this model to the theory of the firm and to theo­
ries of bargaining» this assumption would be relaxed to include price-
setting possibilities. 
Equations 15 to l8 represent the individual's set of beliefs or state 
of knowledge. IT is a function which maps each commodity onto some subset 
of the activity space. This relation is basically one of technology and 
environment. In other words ^represents the extent that the individual 
believes that any particular commodity will service the activities under 
consideration. Suppose that a desired activity were transportation- This 
activity could be serviced by various commodities available on the market 
from shoe leather to jet aircraft. The relation T specifies the knowledge 
the individual has as to these commodity-activity relations. Different 
Individuals who have the same information sets could be expected to have 
similar opinions of product-activity relations. This is not to imply that 
in fact this relation is exogenous to the individual or that expectations 
do not play a large role in everyday activity. But these are more or less 
factual data and would include such things as the length of time required 
or necessarily associated with a particular product-activity combination. 
Equation l4 is the individual's believed relation between drives and 
the efficacy of various activities. Traditionally, the analysis of con­
sumer demand theory has presumed that the individual has only one con­
straint, a budget constraint- The individual was free to select any com­
bination of commodities he wanted as long as the budget constraint was 
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satisfied. However this is clearly not a valid assumptioa as, for example, 
tivw s>et of psrszis-Gitle ?rod>>ct-5 have been limited Vy society since earliest 
history. The importance of personal calculus and consequent commodity 
selection in determining the conmodity mix which society produces and thus, 
to some extent the course of social progress, depends upon the number of 
constraints imposed upon the individuals and the extent of their knowledge 
sets. If the constraint set is relatively large as dictated by technology 
and social laws and mores, both explicitly and implicitly stated, then the 
effect of indivdual selection is insignificant upon the overall mix of 
commodities produced, %e general construction of Model ).l allows for 
explicit delineation of each constrednt effective upon the individual. In 
Model 5.2 it will be assumed that there are two relevant constraints which 
the individual must face, a time constraint, equatioi 15, page and an 
institutional budget constraint, 16. Hie budget restriction as further 
delineated by equation page assumes that the individual cannot buy 
more in value than he sells. In general, activities would have more 
dimensions than sickly a time dimension. That is, the quality or inten­
sity as well as the duration of an activity could vary. Each activity is 
defined such that its dimensionality is time. Two similar activities 
differing in quality would be defined as separate activities. 
Model 3.2 
Define: 
1. S* = set of drives 
2. »R 
3- Vf* = set of all possible activities 
4. W* = set of known activities 
W* = "economic" activities 
= "otûer" activities 
7» W* C W*; W* a W* in. case of perfect information 
a W* 
JWW* = e = null set 
8. W:W*U«^— 
9» X* = set of all conceivable commodities 
10. X* = set of known commodities 
11. X:X*— 
X:X*— 
12. P = , P^) = given price vector, if the commodity is sold, 
P^ < 0, if the commodity is acquired, P^ > 0 
15. YzX— 
14. 0:W'—^R, vhere 0 = 0*. <P, 0*:W-^S*, T:S*—>R 
15. f:W—= "time used," T < 
16. i;X—= "money balance," K < 
17. K;W*—»wO 
_ > knowledge functions 
18. y\:X*—^X*J 
A basic conclusion of Model 5.2, from the first-order conditions for 
a maximum, is equation 9, page )6. is the effect of a small incre-
ox. 
à I" 
ment in product x. on drive reduction, S. • y " is the effect of a small 
Î Î 
increment of x^ on the time used. is the marginal drive satisfaction 
è 0 ^0 from any noneconomic activity since , for all i and j. 
Assume; 
(1) S = 0(w^ , ..., w^ , f 
3  ^
()) ® •••* *0,'^1' ***'^ni^ 
ox 
(4} M. E P.x 
1=1 ^ ^  
Max. S 
subject to 
t S  T q  
(5) M S 0 
w, <tf, X > 0 
\ = 0(w^, ..., v^, ..., à>J + X^(TQ - ..., w^, ..., tàj 
k 
(ô) — - )v ( Z P X J 
i=l ^  
Kuhn-Tucker Coaditicms : 
(7) 4Xj àWj^ ••• âw^ 4x^ \ ^*i 
+ ... + V ^ "J'xT ~ ^ • • • > ^ 
if < 0, then x. = 0 ix. ' 1 
T %  '  jê: -  ^ 2 °  • * • '  
if < 0, then «^ = 0 
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if -|^ > 0, thea « 0 
- EP.x. > 0; £P.x. > 0 
^i 1 - * 1 i ^  
if > 0, then = 0 
From T> if the equality holds, then: 
•••  *  *r  i ï")  -  Vi  
For all i wnere t ^  = 0: 
*1 
y JL^-^ W/jA^k f ? 
1 fci K U.1 *=^1^ 
^ Z ^0 ^0/ ) *>k f 
k=l i ff \ k=l a v,_ 6x, / 
Since 
±ê_ ° m 
*"1 ' k=i *'% 
tif ° >>• *"11 
*^^1 ° k.i 
I 
3D 
then 
(9) 
M-, . JJL 
p. 4x- IfTâZF ax. 
pT " iW55 ÎF" 
-ft - îWfc- • TT 
Prom equation 9 one can see that any set of coamodities which maximizes 
a constrained utility functicm also maximizes the ccmstrained 0 function. 
In 9 the traditicmal concept of marginal utility is broken down into the 
marginal drive reducticm t ^  and the shadov price, expressed in drive 
^i 
reduction terms, of the marginal time use of the commodity. The tradition­
al concept of preference as expressed by a utility indicator has been 
delineated in Model ^ .2 into actual drive reduction minus the opportunity 
cost of marginal time use. 
Let the maximum S attainable under the assumptions of Model ).2 = S* = 
0{w^*, <«^*), then = ^^*1^' ***' vhere 
Xj = the amount of cosmodity j necessary to fulfill activity at a level 
w^*. If x^* =s amount of commodity x^ exchanged in the time period under 
k 
consideration, where Z P.x.* < 0, the conditions on x* are the following: 
i=l ^  ^  
a. X * > max. x.^; j = 1, —, k 
J J 
° i 
b. X * < Z X ; j = 1, ..., k 
^ i=l J 
If X.* = max. x^ for any combination of economic activities selected, 
then X. can be defined as a purely general good. That is, an amount x 
will service several activities without additional units of x^ being 
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i 
aecessazy. If x * » Z x. , thea x can be defined as a purely divis-
•J i«i ^ 
able çood ta that if x, is used of aey we activity, it can not aiiaulta-
neously be used for another activity. In general the nature of any com­
modity would fall between these two extremes. It is intuitively obvious 
that the more the commodities become purely divisable in their activity 
contribution, ceteris paribus, the greater will be the feasible S*. 
To analyze the effect of a price change on the optimal commodity-
activity mix, assume that there is a small change in the price of com­
modity i, dP^ > 0, îrtiere all commodities are purely divisable. 
Rewriting 8 as 
îAere 
* 1 1 
^0 y M. 
k=l »*k 
^*i k=l ^^i 
then for simplicity, assuming 0 for i = 1, k and differentiating 
8 with respect to P^, is in matrix notâticaa: 
Uo) '[-%]' 
where ^ 0j is a (k+nH-2 x k+mfg) matrix of seccxid partial derivities of 0, 
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bordered by prices and the first derivative of the second constraint vith 
respect t<? the decision variable» typical teHss in the Hessian matrix 
are: 
^ (h ^ 
"TZTTZT > j - °* 
M ' 
«mi- 'v'-r^  
k+ik+j ^ ~ 2 
is a (k+m+2 x l) vector vith typical terms 
— , in positions 1 through k. 
-Tp t in positions k+1 through m, 
• i 
i \ 
-p" , in positicxis k-WH-l and k-Hn+2. 
[«• is a (k+m+2 x l) vector with all zeros save for the ith place and 
1 the k+m+1 th place, lAiich are and x^, respectively, 
Solving equatiœi 30by Cramer's Rule: 
(11) 4^ . Xg . X, 
^Greater mathematical detail is presented in the Appendix to Chapter 
III. 
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viixch. is the familiar Slutslty equatioa with the income and wealth effects> 
where W. - J is a eofactor determinate and i$ a determiaate of the 
» A, j « 
full -bordered Hessian matrix. 
The traditional results from utility theory as to the sigpi of \ p, 
^ j 
follow without qualification. In terms of Model -r--—r— is 
\% \2^ 
r.. — - X r .r gjaà. the substitution effect of an own price change 
is negative. 
An analogous effect to the income effect in the traditional Slutsky 
equation would arise if the individual were faced by a change in the budget 
restriction by replacing 0 in the budget restriction above by a more gen­
eral MQ = budget constraint. This is interpreted as market credit condi­
tions which could be greater than, equal to, or less than zero. If 
society required positive balances to the maintained, Ihen MQ > 0. If the 
social system allowed its members to go into debt, then MQ < 0. 
With an exogenous change in the initial budget constraànt, dK^ >0, 
then £0j ^  * where is a vector with all zeros except 
in the last place which is -1. 
Thus 
^*i ( ^ \i+k+m+2 (^k+m+l,ij 
(^2' \n 
follows by CrsBner's Rule. The wealth effect in 11 is identical to a change 
in the budget restriction's effect, 12, on the optimum x^ chosen. For a 
consumer with initial wealth a change in the price level creates a wealth 
effect, ar.rt this is identiceil to a change in market credit conditions. 
Either case gives the individual more purchasing power. 
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From 8 several interesting observations can be derived frcxa assvunp-
xions abotti Lhe terzs therein.;. Five cases are examined below. 
I. Since 
(9) 
then if 
w / w  .AIL 
p. ' à0/^x - Ï0nu> > * 
^ ix, j 
then 
(1) 
IWHÇ-'dTTil^ ' 
Pi à0/ax. ^ 
Pj'TWïX • 
In vords, if the marginal tradeoff "between the satisfaction of two com­
modities is equGLl to the marginal tradeoff between the time usage of the 
two commodities, then the price ratio of the commodities must be equal to 
the marginal rate of commodity substitution with respect to drive reduc­
tion alone. 
"• , aUIc. 4, 
K J 
and if , all k, j. 
^i.e., let p = , if g = ^  then ad = cb. Then since p(c-kd) = 
a - kb or ^ (ac-kda) = a - kb, and since da - cb,^(ac-kcb) = a - kb; then 
^(a-kb) = a - kb. Thus P = ~ • 
Therefore 
à0 î_^ )g)/^W à f y 
^^k=l **1 
p. a , n. > 
J 
^0 Z _ ) 0/ W è 1^ Z ^  k
or 
^v k»l ix " Tl^Té^ ' è V kal àx 
J J 
. iv. 
(2) 5- k=i ^*i p, a as 
£ 
k=i 
Tnat is, if the time used by ail eccsosic activities is equivalent and 
also that used by all ncmeconomic activities is equivalent, tiien the price 
ratio of two commodities i and j is equal to tne ratios of the sum total 
effect of the commodity oa activity levels. 
III. If -5-^ = for all k, i, and j 
qX^ 
? >0 .è0/^ct? " ^^k 
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^2 
or 
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Equation 5 states that the price ratio of any two comiuodities must be 
equal to the ratio of tae effects of the commodities on, any one activity 
if each commodity effects all activities equally. 
IV. If - 0 , 
then 
P. \ iX. 
t'im J ' J 
Simplification U is the generauL intuitive interpretation of utility 
theory, i.e., one where the only relevant constraints are those of budget­
ary nature. Although the marginal time use by ncaieconomic activities is 
not necessarily zero, this is negated as the marginail value of these 
activities is zero. 
V. Finally if the time restriction is not relevant, in tnat additional 
commodity purchasing requires no use of time, i.e., if » = \ =0 , 
then again as in 1 and 4; 
P. 
(5) 57 - TWî^j 
As society becomes more affluent, the assus^tions of IV and V become 
less realistic. Noneconomic activities begin to assume a positive marginal 
value evaluated at the optimal solution, while tne time consumed in ac­
quiring more commodities becomes more relevant. 
In the aext section the above results vill be interpreted in a graph­
ical maoner in order to develop a fuller understanding of the scope of 
Model >.2's expansion to demand theory. First a slight digression to prove 
a simple theorem will aid the graphical presentation. The theorem is 
couched in terms of the traditional utility theory but is equally ^pli-
cable to the concepts of Model ).2 with a change in terminology. 
Define an. independent consumption process (ICP) as one where for any 
bundle of goods (x^, .. x^) the individaaL has a choice of independently 
consuming any or all goods or consuming them in combinations. That is to 
say, for any subset S C £l, .. », n| of commodity types, there exists a 
function V (x-, ..., x ) such that U(x^, x ) = max. 2 V (x., x ). 
si n X n alls 
Theorem 1. If ICP and each is concave, then U(x^, ..., x^) is ccaicave. 
Proof of theorem 1 follows directly since the sum of concave functions 
is a concave function. 
Theorem 2. If U(x^, ..., x^) is a concave fUncticm, then an indifference 
curve, the locus of all points x = (x^, ..., x^), y = (y^, ..., y^), ..., 
that U(x) = U (y) = ... = U^, is convex to the origin. 
Proof: 
let X = (x*, ..., 3^) 
y — (x£, ..», x^) 
X ^ J 
U(x) = D(y) 
then by definition of a concave function 
U(\x + (l-X)y) > U(x) for 0 < X < 1 om 
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Graphically: 
x> 
Pig. 5.1 A convex indifference curve. 
Tbeorems 1 and 2 add a bit of intuitive appeal to the drawing of 
convex indifference curves. An interpretation would "be that if each com­
modity taken singly has diminishing marginal utility and a commodity can 
be consumed individually or in a group with other cooamodities, then the 
indifference curves must be convex to the origin. That is, two (or more) 
commodities would never be combined in a ccmsumption process if consuming 
each separately would produce more satisfaction. 
Assuming that independent consumption processes and independent 
activities exist and assuming that there are only two activities and two 
goods. Model 5.2 can be reduced to a two-space analogy in graphical form. 
By these assumptions and theorems 1 and 2, the locus of all points where 
any combination of activities w^ and w^ create equal amounts of drive 
reduction is mapped on Figure 3.I and labeled S^. is the time con­
straint. The linear nature of the time constraint in Figure 5-2 assumes 
that the activities do not interact. If both activities could be carried 
out simultaneously, T^T^ would be a right angle. In general, one would 
expect T^Tg to be concave to the origin. If T^T^ were convex to the origin 
4  ^
and given the eissumption of a convex iso-drive reduction curve with 
respect to activities and then the solution would be a comer solu­
tion and only one activity would be relevant for a maximizing solution. 
Implicit in Figure is also a budget constraint which is omitted for 
purposes of clarity. The individual maximizes drive reduction by select­
ing w* and w*, both of which in. turn imply a particular commodity bundle 
be purchased. 
The commodity bundle purchased by w^ and w* will be on the e^cpansion 
path, or cost-minimizing patn, of activity in Figure ).) and on the 
expansion path of activity in Figure Again^ here theorem 1 and 
the assumption of independence sure implemented as the "iso-activity" 
curves are drawn ccxivex to the origin. The relationship between economic 
activities would not necessarily be sLLong the cost-minimizing path if the 
commodities were not purely divisable. Given some commodity which is 
concomitantly utilized in two activities, he total cost of the two activ­
ities would be minimized. 
Fig. 5-2. Two activities and a time constraint. 
kb 
Pig. 5'3* Two commodities and an activity expansitm path 
activity p4t>i 
M. n. *t 
Fig. Two commodities and a activity expansion 
Figure 5»5 assumes that the expansion path of activities and 
is linear with respect to products and Xg. At this point, the analogy 
between this model and linear programming—if w^ =» (x^, x^) is 
linear and homogeneous—as eg^lied to the firm or linear activity 
analysis is obvious.^ 
Figure also makes a very special assunqotion that the marginal 
effect on drives of an additional unit of activity is constant. Graphi-
•'rùrther attention will be given to this fact in Chapter V. 
4? 
Fig. 5.5- Two commodities, two activity expansion, paths, and 
an iso-drive reduction curve» 
cally it assumes that the iso-drive reduction curve is a straight line or 
that the two activities are perfect substitutes as in Figure ).6, i.e., 
è 0/ i 
= constant. 
Fig. ).6. Linear iso-drive reduction curve between two 
activities. 
Eius combining Figure ).2 and Figure ^ .5 an "iso-drive reduction" 
curve is traced out much the same as iso-profit curves are drawn for a firm 
with a linear producticwi technology and which faces constant prices. If 
the time constraint were drawn in, the maximum would occur at (l) point a, 
(2) point b, or (5) any point between and including a and b, in Figure 
5.5. 
w 
The geometrical analysis can be pursued further vith a single model 
or t.'C activities two products by assumiag that each activity is. 
solely a function of one product and this relation is linear» 
Assume: 
(1) 2 activities 
= consumption 
*2 » labor activity 
(2) 2 commodities 
= food 
Xg = hours of labor 
(5) « b^ x^  
Vg = b^g 
(W s » 0(w^, Vg) 
(5) T = + tgWg 
of 
increax tug pr«femMc 
y 
Fig. 5.7. Two commodities, two activities, time and budget constraints 
with a linear drive reduction map. 
K9 
Fig. ).8. Two commodities, two activities, time and budget con­
straints with, a linear drive reduction map. 
Fig. 3-9- Two commodities, two activities, time and budget con­
straints with iso-drive reduction curves convex to the 
Xg, Wg axis. 
In Figures 3«T-5-9 above, the graphical solution to tne problem is 
presented. In Figure 5-7 the implicit eissumption is that carrying out of 
no activities is a feasible solution and that the S functicm is linear 
with respect to the trade-off between Wg (work) and w^ (ccmsumption). 
50a 
Figure 5.8 assumes tiaat again the marginal rate of substitution between 
is but tnat there is minimum level ot necessary for 
S to equaLL 0 (point d. Figure ).8). In Figure ).9 the marginal rate of 
substitution between activities is. decreasing as more and more is 
taken. 
Ml# 
Fig. 5.10. Two cocaaodities, two activities with a maximizing 
solution on the budget constraint but less than the 
time constraint. 
In Figure ^.10 again the situation is presented vrtiere there is 
diminishing maz^nal rate of activity substitution, but the solutitxi is 
one lAere the time restriction is not relevant. 
In all cases above 
ÀA. < O 
M _ >  
50b 
/ AP/ti 
constant ) ^ 
^^2 \ «^2 
Under these conditions, the solution must lie along oa. Figure ).10, 
including the endpoints. 
Expanding the analysis to three activities: 
"a ' *2(^3) 
"5 - «((Xj) 
V y 
where: -5—- = constant; i = 1,2,3 then the feasible set becomes 
•*i 
oajbc in Figure ).ll, a tetrahedron with faces oab and ocb at right angles 
ihe X, to each other along th g axis 
T6T. 
Fig. 3.11. Three conanodities and three activities. 
If both activities w^ and are to be relevant, then the indifference 
curves between w^ and w^ will have to have the traditional convex form. 
If the trade-off between work (w^) and either activity is constant, the 
optimal solution will lie on ca or c'a' projected down onto the wyw^ plane-
c'a' is an induced budget restriction in that it depends not only 
upon the prices of activities w, and but upon the wage rate, the total 
time available, and the "willin^ess" to work, c'a' is the budget con­
straint if «ad only if the optimal solution lies along ca and the indi­
vidual will work between od and oe units of time. This is the analogous 
solution to those of Figures 5.6 and 5«9« A solution of Figttre 5.10 type, 
a nontime relevant solution, would place the solution closer to the origin 
than ca and the correspondingly the time spent working would be less than 
oc. 
Nov suppose that there is a change in the relative prices of and 
Xg such that the amount of time spent working necessary to carry out 
activity is now less. This is pictured in Figure 5.12. 
Fig. 3.12. Three activities with a shift in the budget constraint 
due to a price change. 
^2 
The budget restrictioa ia the plane shifts from tt < 0 to K' <0 
csises ti2e induced budget restrictioa OB the plane to shift out­
ward from c'a' to c'a"'. Under the traditional assumption of the undesir-
ability of writing, activity the maximum time the individual could 
spend working would change from oe to od. Note that before the price 
change labor output is maximized if the solution is at a, and after the 
price change the solution for maximum labor output would be at c. 
In Figure ).l) the induced budget restriction as projected onto the 
x^x^ plane is shown as the heavily shaded line. Nominal income is hi^-
est at a* and falls as you move along c'a' from a' to c'. 
«X 
Fig. ^ .1). induced budget constraint between two activities. 
c'a' represents an upper bound on the feasible limits of activities 
and w^ using commodities and x^. 
ïhe instant that any of the above assumptions are relaxed the graph­
ical analysis quickly becomes quite cluttered. Suppose that activities 
and w^ are a fùncticm of x^ and Xg but that the least cost activity expan-
sicm paths remain linear as in Figure ).l4. Since these activity expan­
sion paths are derived under a given set of prices, any change in relative 
5) 
prices of and will shift the activity paths as well. la Figure 
3>.l^ the •>m.->nc5->ooAl diagram showing the feasible set oahc is 
presented. 
X, 
Fig. ).l4. Two linear activity paths which use some of two 
commodities. 
'i 
Fig. 5»15- Three activities, two of•rfiich use two commodities. 
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With, a rise in toe price of there will be a shift ia the optimal 
ac-tivit-y expansion paths. Such a shift Is shown, in Figure ).l6, along 
with the shift ia the iaiiuced budget constraint from c'a' to d'e'. 
Fig. 3.1b. Shift in the induced budget constraint between activities 
using two commodities due to a commodity price change. 
From this cursory presentation^ the effects of a change in the know­
ledge set can be evaluated. Using Model a coo^arative static analysis 
constrasting equilibrium states can be analyzed. A more rigorous specific­
ation as to how learning takes place will be presented in Chapter IV. At 
this point a certain evaluatiwi is possible without further information as 
to how the change in the knowledge set occurred. 
A change in knowledge could result from a myriad of circumstances. 
It could represent a gain of information to the individual which was 
available previously but simply unlearned. On the other hand, it could 
result directly from a technologicstl change in the state of the arts. 
Each of these situaticsis represent a change in the knowledge set for the 
individual. Some aspect of the calculus process must give way to a new 
one. Thus, in the analysis to follow, the ^proach is sufficiently general 
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to iaclude the evaluation of technical change as a special case of a more 
gcnsrsl c2iaz22? ict knowledge set. 
Technological change in its most general sense is nothing but simply 
a change in knowledge. %is change can be embedded either in a particular 
product or a certain manufacturing process» or it can be change in the 
uses of existing products, services, and resources. The first type is 
usually termed embodied technological change, lâiile the second is termed 
disembodied. %e distinction between technical change and any general 
change in knowledge is essentially twofold. First, technological change 
is limited to those changes in the knowledge set idiich are associated 
with ccxnmodities, either directly as improved product or product use or 
indirectly as a change in the methods of manufacture or commodity creation 
so that the commodity can be more cheaply produced. Seccmdly, techno­
logical change is generally limited to those knowledge changes which 
occur at the boundary or the knowledge frontier. 
In the following analysis, the more robust ccmsideration of any 
change in the knowledge set will be pursued with illustrative examples of 
technological change evaluation as special cases. Also the analysis will 
assume that an changes in knowledge are beneficial; that is, the new 
knowledge leads one to a higher level of drive reduction. This procedure 
does not dismiss the possibility of changes in knowledge which result in a 
deterioration of satisfaction but the analyticsuL argument would be symmet­
rical. Rirther it is postulated that increases in drive reduction feasi­
bility are the more important case. As a motivating force for raticmal 
individuals, the tendency would be in the direction of increasing potential 
satisfaction rather than the masochistic pursuits implied by the latter. 
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la terns of Model 5.2 a change in the knowledge set can be classified 
into five «ïlffereat typea. Froo. the basic etpiatioos of the model, 
S » 0(wj^, Wj^> É^> 
= ^^^1 **•' ^ ^  ^ 
K 
2 P.x. < 0 
i»l ^ 
(w^, ..., —^0 * 
Knowledge change can. occur by: (I) the product set (x^, aCj^) eaqpands 
or changes so that for some activity, w^, there is now a new optimal 
activity expansion path;^ (II) there is a change in the functional rela-
ticm between the product set (x^, x^) and the activity level, w^; (ill) 
there is a change in the functional relation between activities and time 
used OS that activities can be carried out more intensively; (IV) the 
knowledge et of known activities expands or changes such that there is a 
shift in the optimal drive reduction path; or (V) there is a change in the 
perceived functionsJ relationship between activities and drives. In addi­
tion to these pure case I-V it is possible that any specific change will 
occur simultaneously in combination with other types. 
Types I-V represent a change in knowledge lAich is independent of 
other's knowledge sets. However, in the situation where the individual's 
action depends upon the knowledge sets of others, e.g., in a game strategy 
context, the types of change would have to be considerably enlarged. For 
example, the decisicm by individual i to purchase commodity j which was to 
be used in status attsânment would depend upon other's knowledge about the 
"^Ehis is the sole kind of technical change analyzed by Lancaster 
(1966). 
57 
cotmaodities available. A commodity acquired for purposes of status, by the 
very rt2.t>ire of status, requires kjaovfledge on the part of those to be im­
pressed. Itie following analysis will be restricted to those changes in the 
knowledge set i&ich have no dependence upon the knowledge sets of others. 
Type I—For a type I change in the knowledge set to have a relevant 
effect upon the constrained maxinmm position of the individual, the optimal 
activity expansion path must shift in the direction of a cheaper good. 
The simplest case is illustrated in Figure 5» IT where a new product, 
Xy becomes known; in combination with this will fulfill the require­
ments for activity w^, \^ereas before only would fulfill w^. Since the 
price of x_ is less than the price of x^, the new feasible maximum activ­
ity level of w_, w* is greater than w. 
Fig- 5.IT. Shift in activity expansion path due to a change in the 
known commodity set. 
The maximum time worked under the irksomeness of labor assumption 
drops from od to od' as the feasible set shifts from oab to oa'b in 
Figure ).17. Obviously the old w^ level can now be attained with labor 
< od' < od. 
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Figure 5.18 shows a type I change where the products aad were 
hnoyi the knowledge chatige aadL a shift occurs io, the cost atiai-
ffiiziag expansion path of toward the axis of the cheaper good x^. 
Figure 5.13 shows the x^x^ plane along with induced budget shifting from, 
c*a' to c'a'''. 
'3 
Fig. 5-1Ô. Shift in the activity path due to a change in the know­
ledge of the efficacy of commodities as shown in three 
dimensions. 
Figure 5.20 shows the same knowledge change as Figures 5.18 and 5.19, 
as well as showing the shift of the "budget line from c'a' to c'a''', "but 
in terms of the w^w^ plane. and are arbitrary "iso-drive reduction" 
curves. 
The more general mathematical equivalent of the graphical presenta­
tion of type I technical change. Figures 5»17-5»20 is as follows: 
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Fig. 5.19. Shift in the activity path shown in two dimensions. 
Wi e 
Fig. 3-20. Shift in the induced "budget constraint between activ­
ities due to a change in the knowledge set. 
Let; 
(x^, ..., x^) = known commodities before knowledge change 
(x^, .Xj^, x^^^) = expanded known commodity set 
S* = max. S with (x^, ..., x^) known 
S** = max. S with x^, *k+l^ known 
Without loss in generality, assume S** > S*. Since in all cases associated 
with a type I altération of the knowledge set where the increase in know-
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led&e has a relevant effect upon max. S, the analytical equivalent is a 
reduction in tue price û£ aetlvitiss effected by the newly discoveresi 
coBsaodities, the effect can be analyzed in the Slutsky equation format. 
Define the price of activity as then a change in the knowledge 
set is mathematically equivalent to dPw^ < 0 for the effected activity 
such that > 0. Therefore in this case, from the Slutsky equation, 
^*i dw^ 
one can solve for as 
dPj - "TM "i % 
wiere |0) is a bordered Hessian matrix. The first term in (l) is the 
substitution effect and the seccmd term is the income effect on activity 
selection. The concept Pv^ is composed of both the actual money expendi­
tures on coDBOodities to service activity and the value of time measured 
by its shadov price. In spite of the expanded format the analytical 
results are analogous to the traditioial Slutsky analysis. 
Analogously, noimal and inferior activities can be defined depending 
upon the sign of the income effect. If the activity is an inferior one 
and ftirther if the income effect more than offsets the substitution effect, 
then the activity is a Griffen activity. However, since a Giffen activ­
ity violates the etssun^ticms above; viz, > 0 and S** > S*, the generauL 
dw 
case would be > 0 . 
i 
To analyze the effect upon commodity demand, assume that is the 
only activity effected by the changs in the knowledge set and further that 
^or greater detail see the Appendix to Chapter III. 
6l 
is a fUttction of two goods and which are purely divisable. 
Vi>-
Since dw^ > 0 
then dx.  > 0 • 
Since the newly discovered commodity has a relevant effect 
> 0 and assuming that both ^ > O then dx^ > 0 . If the 
demand for is adversely effected by the knowledge change, i.e., if 
dx^<0 
K1 • 
jQniSf the fall in quantity demanded of x^ will be directly proportional 
to the increase in demand for x^^^—the proportion depending upon the ratio 
of the marginal activity contribution of x^ and x^^^, i.e., — • 
If the cODBDodities have some general characteristics, the preceding 
results are vitiated to some extent. For example, suppose initially that 
X. = purely general good and furthermore that max. x^ = x^ . If a  change 
J ^ J J 
in the knowledge set occurs for, say, = Y^(x^, ..., x^), h ^  1 such 
that for S* (equal to the maximum level of drive reduction attainable 
stfter the change in knowledge set) max. x^ - x^, i.e., the amount of x. 
i J J J 
needed is unchanged; then even thou^ the equilibrium level of S* had 
increased due to a change in knowledge, there would be no effect on the 
demand for x^. 
In general, if x^ is not a purely divisible good and a change in 
knowledge occurs such that S* = 0(w*, tû*, ...,ci)*) changes to 
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S** = 0(v*, w* + & where iwj^ > 0 and 
&w = y (Çx . —. . —»ix-), theaSx., would aot be equîvaleat to 
n. ti * j" & 0 
the change in demand for Xy The change in demand would depend upon the 
degree of general usuage of and the specific characteristics of the 
maximizing S** solution of the individual calculus. 
Type II—This type of a change in the individual's set is a situa­
tion where the same amount of goods will fulfill a greater number of activ­
ity units. In other words* in activity - V^(x^, ..., x^) the function 
kC changes, such that for a given level of inputs (x^, -.., x^), w^ > 
where w^ is the activity level after change. This could be construed as 
disembodied knowledge change from the point of view of the consumer, 
whereas type I could be thou^t of as embodied. Type I is associated 
directly with a change in knowledge of a particular commodity, and type 
II represents a changed use of existing commodities. 
As an illustration, suppose that w^ in Figure ).21 is affected by 
type II change so that the point d is shifted back to d' (d and d' are 
identical number of units of activity w^ before and after knowledge 
change). After some learning process has altered the knowledge set, the 
new feasible activity set in Figure 5-21 would be oa"bc, and in terms of 
Figure 5«21 the induced budget restriction c'a* would appear to shift 
backward to c'a' ' '. 
This, however, is not the case as unit measure of the Wg ray has 
changed. Therefore in Figure 5-22 the same increased knowledge is 
represented with the unit measure of the activity held constant. 
The induced budget condition on w^i^, c'a' shifts out to c'a'"' and 
altoou^ prices remain fixed the iso-cost curves also shift outward, e.g.. 
Fig. 5.21. Change in the efficacy of a commodity in servicing an activity 
as shown in three dimensions. 
Fig. 5-22. Change in the efficacy of a commodity in servicing an activ­
ity as shown on a tvo-dimenslcoial activity plane. 
figure 5 «21 assumes that the homogeneity of Y. is unaffected althou^ 
in general the degree of honK>geneity may or may not^e affected- If the 
homogeneity of T. were affected, the optimal, cost-minimizing, activity 
expansion paths would shift and in general become nonlinear. 
ok 
fa' shifts, out to fg. (or fg) and CQ (or fa') represent the same 
cKicurits of !2or>ey prices» but is beft>re îaaovledge change and CJ is 
after the improvement. It should be clear that prices of products remain 
constant, but prices of activities change, as is shown by the shifting 
curves in Figure 5.22» Clearly, then, the Slutsky analysis of type II is 
identical with type I as the altered knowledge manifests itself as a 
ciiange in tae price of activities. It should be reiterated that tue price 
of an activity differs among individuals even though they service the 
activity with identical commodities, in that a component of the activity 
price is an opportunity cost. 
Type HI—This type of knowledge set alteration is also disembodied 
in that tnere is a change in such that for any T (time used) there is 
a greater amount of (w^, ..., w^) which is now feasible. This is pernsqps 
best interpreted intuitively as the smoothing of frictions in the economy 
or tne allowance for activities to be carried on more intensively. 
In the graphical interpretation. Figure $.2), the time constraint 
shifts outward as the measures of w^, are held constant. In this case 
*« 
, X, 
Fig. 5•25' Shift in the time constraint snoun in two dimensions. 
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tae ci3,aoge ia the knowledge set results in a change in the price of 
sctivities- in this case the change in. the price of an activity 
is due solely to the shadow price component, the opportunity cost of time. 
Fbrmally, however, the Slutsky analysis is unchanged traa. type I as ana­
lytically the result is a change in activity price, dPw. 
Type lY—Type IV knowledge enhancement Is represented by a change 
in the known activity set. For exaotple, known activities might change 
from (w^, ..., w^, ..., to (w^, w^, 
. The analysis heretofore has assumed that changes in knowledge 
increase the known activity set. That is, presvimably knowledge change 
does not destroy old activities, although it may very well make old activ­
ities inefficient. 
With types-I-IlI it was assumed that the maximum value of S after 
the increase in knowledge was greater than or equal to the maximum S be­
fore change. Hh&t is, if the change In known relations is relevant to 
the state of drive reduction of the individual, it must be such that tne 
feasible maximum is increased. However, with type IV and V this postu­
late is not as likely to hold true. Since tne general intuitive interpre­
tation of a change in the known activity set is any change in ideas, it is 
quite conceivable that sucn a new idea would open a host of fears and tnus 
reduce the maximum drive reduction attainable. For example it could be 
argued that the developnent of nuclear energy and the atomic bomb opened 
up a range of additional new activities. As the people of the world 
learned of these new ideas the drive for security increased, and the result 
was a lowering of the maximum drive reduction immediately available. This 
leads to an entire complex of new activities being innovated, such as bomb 
6b 
shelters in the 1950's and a gradual liut radical aad necessary nxetaiaor-
O- foreij^a j>oli.oy pf -the ma.)or powers as the Knowledge sets chaii&ed 
front the early 1940's to the late 1960's. This is probably the exception 
rather than, the rule, at least in the early stages of nev technology. 
Ostensibly, the driving forces behind inventicxi and innovation is further 
drive reducticxi. Even in the case of the atomic bomb, the initial pur­
pose was the winning of World War II and increased immediate security. 
From the postulates associated with Model ).2 the new maximum value 
of drive reduction and the corresponding constrained optimal activity 
mix after a change in the knowledge set need not be in any particular 
correspcaadence with the activity mix selected before knowledge increases. 
Formally let: 
(1) max. = S» = 
(2) max, [s . 0(>r^, •••» V "nrt'*^1' """^m' ' 
«Si'"»!' —'«'Si) . 
Then without recourse to further infonnation such as the specific delina-
tion of the drive set and thus to the degree of substitutibility of the 
newly learned activity and old activities or information as to the nature 
of the learning process itself, no comparison is possible between activit­
ies selected under the old maximum, S*, and activities under the new 
maximum S**. 
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If the analysis is limited to expanding the known activity set from 
oni^ Activity to tvo» then the amount of decrease in the old activity will 
be proportional to the increase in the newly discovered activity, the 
proportion depending upon the ratio of the marginal drive reduction of the 
two activities. This is, of course, assuming the individual is not affected 
by change in the knowledge sets of others with respect to this new activity 
and it is a relevant activity to his optimal activity selection. 
Type V—In this situation the analysis is quite similar to type TV. 
Here the known activity set is constant >âiile the functional relation 
between drives and activities is altered. While in general there is no 
conclusive hypotheses as to the relative nature of the two sets of activ­
ity selection, some analysis is possible. As contrasted to type IV know­
ledge change, for example, it is possible that the new equilibrium could 
leave the activity mi% selected unchanged and consequently there would 
be no change in commodity demand. Additional information as to the nature 
of the learning process could provide data as to specific changes in the 
functional relation between activities and drives. For example, the change 
in the knowledge set could be limited to some subset of the total avail­
able activities. In essense this amounts to a parametric change in the 
objective functi(Xi of the individual, and a certain amount of work hets 
been done with this type of analysis. A further discussion of this area 
of s^plicatiOQ is presented in Chapter V. 
As one can quickly ascertain from the graphicsLl presentation of the 
types of technical change, there is no completely accurate objective 
method for measuring the value of a change in knowledge given the present 
data available. 
If the S function is assumed to have meaningful cardinal properties 
an<i ÎS m accurate measure of %6at is meant by personal welfare, then the 
criterion of improvement would be the chstoge in drive reduction available 
(e.g., Sp in Figure 5.20)» To be empirically useful, one would have 
to meeisure drive reduction over the period which the activity lasts. Even 
if this could be done for a single individual, many reservations would be 
forthcoming as to the meaning of aggregating over different individuals to 
ascertain the toteuL value of the improvement. Any such social welfare 
criterion is sure to be an arbitrary value judgment. 
The traditional method of calculating the cost reduction of an activ­
ity \diich has been affected by a change in knowledge fails to account for 
the marginal evaluation of the increased activity feasibility. This 
procedure has been one of calculating the cost saving and allowing others 
to interpret the psychological welfare equivalents of such a change. How­
ever, for types III, IV, and V there is no change in cost whatsoever -rfiile, 
in general, there would be a change in the optimal outlay for activities. 
Figure gives the graphical presentation of a type I or type II 
improvement. After the knowledge set is e0.tered the original activity 
mix (i.e., the tangency at point f of and the original budget line 
c'a') can be purchased by an amount 0** lAich is less than the original 
cost. The knowledge advance has caused an outward shift in the original 
budget line c'a' to c'a'" and an accompanying change in the relative 
prices of the activities, w^ and w^. This is pictured by the fact that the 
original outlay, 0, shifts out to O* after the improvement in knowledge. 
Only under very restrictive conditions would the difference in costs, 0* -
0**, be an indicator of increased personal welfare. 
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•w. 
Fig. 5.24. Change ia outlays for economic activities due to a change 
ia the knowledge set. 
This criteria is clearly not applicable if type III occurs as the 
amount of outlay for the activity mix both before and after the change 
is the same. However, the increased caqpacity for activity selection does 
occur, and thus there is some element of increased, welfare present. As 
is shown in Figures 3«25 and 5-26, the outlay line, 0, is the same both 
before and after the budget shift. 
For type III, then a third objective eiopirical measure presents it­
self as a possible measure of increased welfare and the value of increased 
knowledge, viz., the change in the amounts of an activity feasible 
after the in^rovement. This criteria is also applicable to types I and 
II, as well as III. 
Since I-III result in some shift in the induced budget line, as 
depicted in Figures 5«20, $.24, and 3«26, the value would be oa" ' -oa*. 
In the cases îdiere the increased efficacy of products or activities results 
in an increase in the rnayfrnmn amounts of several activities, the criteria 
might be - Zw^, where = maximum feasible activity w^ after technical 
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Pig. Shift in the time constraint shown in three dimensions. 
Fig. 3» 26. Shift in the induced budget constraint due to a shift 
in the time constraint as shown in two dimensions. 
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change and = aaximum feasible previous to the improved conditions, 
iicïsvsr, it is quite a& to .lust what it mea&s to add up 
activities. When only one activity's feasible maximum is affected, the 
criteria obviously fails to take account of the (assumed) diminishing 
marginal values of such increases. When more than one activity is affecte^ 
the problem is compounded. Not only should the marginal effects be con­
sidered but also the "interactivity tradeoff** or rate of substitution 
between activities would make a great deal of difference in the value of 
the improvement. For example, does it make a difference whether an hour's 
increased time availability can be manifested in sexual acts or eating? 
Only with informaticsi about the drive reduction effect of this increased 
activity feasibility can anything clearly be established. Again inter­
preting drives as representing the meaning of welfare is implicit. ^>ec-
ulation as to how increased time availability or how decreased costs of 
an activity will be used and their consequent benefits to an individual 
cannot be much more than just speculation without a more objective 
critericsi such as drive reduction. The problems associated here with the 
evaluation of technical change as a special case of the more general anal­
ysis of knowledge change are central to a more relevant evaluation of 
welfare and efficiency. 
The foregoing preliminary discussion of knowledge change has ignored 
the cost of learning associated with the change in the constrained maximum 
drive reduction available. Suppose that a change in technology occurs so 
that for the individual a higher level of drive reduction is now feasible 
if the requisite learning alters the knowledge set. Here the cost of 
learning may play an important role. 
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In the implicit analysis of technical change as given above, tech-
rtclcg^' "sss ARRwmeA ng^t to affect activities, and the cost of learaiog 
about new availabilities vas equal to zero. The usefulness of the assump­
tion, that costs of learning are insignificant is that relative to the 
amount of use from the technological change these learning costs only 
occur once while the altered commodity may be used several times, i.e., 
adapting to technical change is an investment as dur£^>le asHie technical 
change is durable. Eiis brings up a slight digression on the resistance 
to change by those meshed in an obsolete technology. Essentially this 
can be coinpared to the difference between a local maximum and a maximum 
maximorium. Beginning from a state of ignorance, the best—in terms of 
costs and the current state of the arts—functional relations upon -which 
to base one's individual calculus are attained as a result of the experi­
ences one goes through. As technology progresses, this means that new 
experiences are now available, and for those starting from a position of 
ignorance a different functional relation would be adjudged better, in 
general, than the ones selected before the change occurred. However, it 
may very well be that the costs associated with unlearning old habits and 
forming new ones would be more costly than the benefits which 
occur. Thus technical changes alter sane people's opinions while not 
changing others. Also, since learning is an investment wit^ respect to 
technical change, those who are younger and expect the benefits to accrue 
over a longer period to time would have more incentive to adapt than 
those imo do not. 
Thus far the conclusion is that the only ccxisistent, unambiguous 
measure of technical change, or any knowledge change, in terms of the 
'O 
models developed here is oae bauaed upon, drive reduction. 'Aie only aitera-
tiGTt that the i^M-ning process places on those comparative static con­
clusions is one of a time lag or an opportunity cost. That is, after the 
technical change occurs with respect to a product set* S* > S becomes 
attainable. %e transition by the individual to this greater level of 
drive reducticsa will depend upon the speed of the learning process. This 
problem can be simplified and approached as a problem in the calculus of 
variations. 
Let: 
= maximum available drive reduction available after technological 
change 
S{t) = actual drive reduction at time t 
K(t) = the knowledge set, i.e., the set of functions used at time t 
in the calculus process 
V = learning activity 
Assume: 
# = 
The drive reduction can now be viewed as a ftinticaa of the knowledge 
set, K, and the learning activity, S = S(k,w). The conditicms for a maxi­
mum, assuming coitinuous functicms, can be derived as follows: 
(l) Max- f S(K(t), w)dt = max.. f S^(K(t), f^)dt 
o o 
Euler-Lagrange conditions for a maximum: 
-p- ' It w ' K' = 35 -
Assuming that 
'A 
(b) > the more of the learning activity which is 
undertaiten., the faster the knowledge set in­
creases; 
(c) — < 0, learning causes drive reduction to decline; 
d% (d) < 0, the rate at ^ riaich learning causes reduction to 
is increasing. 
With the assumption of continuity and the assumptions given by 5, 2 
says that the optimal learning path starts off with a relatively large 
amount of learning and slows down as S(K(t)) approaches S*. Discontinu­
ities in the various functions would imply that the level of learning 
activity would proceed in jumps rather than a smooth decline, tut the 
general notion of the optimal path is the same. Also it should be noted 
that 5c does not necessarily imply that learning in itself is drive en­
hancing. It may very well be drive reducing; however, the equilibrium 
total drive reduction is less with learning included than without, i.e., 
learning is not as effective in reducing drives as other activities avail­
able. 
The value of any type of technical change in terms of the additional 
drive reduction is: 
vhBTe S - maximum drive redaction available before the technological change 
•s^iere S(t) < S* » maximum drive reduction available after the technical 
(1) 
o 
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change.^ Graphically this is shown ia Figures 5-2? and 5.2Ô. 
Fig. 5.27« Learning which causes no loss in drive reduction. 
Fig. 5-2ti. Learning which entails a loss in drive reduction. 
In Figure 3-27 the optimal path fran S to S* does not involve any 
immediate loss in satisfaction, as the immediate returns from learning 
sufficiently offset the losses from the learning activity. In Figure 
3.28 the total value of the technical changes is the lined area minus the 
^Also it is assumed that for the évaluation to occur at any point 
in time current, present, and past, units of drive reduction are ex­
pressed in a common denomination. 
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the cross-hatched area. Of course it is possible that the value in the 
CSSSS such Flgzrs 5-25 >>e negative. If the individual has a 
choice between following S(t) and remaining along S, he would choose S(t) 
only if the value were positive. This is the argument presented earlier 
^ere for some the value of the new technological adaptation would be 
negative while for others it would be positive. That is, any value of 
technical change for the individual depends upon ^ ere the individual 
starts, i.e., his initial knowledge set, the ease of learning or the effect 
of learning on his drive state, and so forth. 
Equation 1, page 7$, expresses the value of the technical change to 
one individual. Any aggregation over various individuals is a problem 
associated with any social welfare criteria, how to compare individuals. 
Of course any such criteria is arbitrary, but given some weighting for 
the various affected individuals of society, an aggregate value could be 
derived. 
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CHAPTER IV. M APPROACH 
TO HQK THE I®OWr®GE SET CHANGES 
To tiiis point the theory of individual behavior has followed a 
personal interest maximization hypothesis (defined as maximizing drive 
reduction) and has generalized tne analysis of consumer behavior to 
encompass a broader context covering all activities as well as those 
involving goods and services, per se. Similarly the constraints nave 
been extended, in principle, to all those which play a significant role 
in the determination of individual behavior; and more specifically for 
the paradigmatic presentation, a time as veil as a budget constraint 
were explicitly formalized into the model of personal calculus. 
In this section tae model will be further generalized as to how-
preferences vary, that is, the generation and alteration of preferences 
will be delineated by a specific and rigorous method. The assumptions 
employed to facilitate handling of any such complex operation are designed 
to extract the relevant forces and the intent is to generate another step 
in tne process of creating a theory of individual behavior which yields 
sufficient results so that the implications are operational. The models 
created should yield a theoretical structure which provides further in-
signt to the problems of a dynamic society and also through which more 
meaningful questions can be raised as to the nature of welfare, efficiency, 
and optimality. 
Heretofore it has been assumed that the initial knowledge set is 
given. In Chapter III the individual was viewed as having a given set of 
knowledge about the various relations wiich were relevant to his decision 
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makiog process, i.e., product-activity relations, activity-drive relations, 
the 9Ct-iylty--time use- relations» the constraint s » and the extent that 
various activities and products were available or "known". In addition, 
an arbitrary change in the knowledge set was analyzed in the comparative 
static sense. However, each of t^ese aspects of the individual's know­
ledge set is somehow generated lato existence and, in general, is also 
revised and altered ets time passes. Each restructuring of the individual's 
set of beliefs comes about by some process. Old relations have to be re­
placed by newer, improved ones. In other words, if the calculus process 
of maximizing drive reduction is sufficiently important for the individual 
to carry out, then he must continually decide upon which functional rela­
tions and product and activity sets are correct, or most nearly correct. 
As with the statistician, physicist, or \diatever, each perscsa must estimate 
the relevancy and the extent of the forces operating in his envircaament. The 
question is how can this behavioral aspect of individuals best be analyzed? 
]5iis analysis of the way in -which the knowledge set changes is a general 
view of a subset of tAiat is usually termed learning. Learning can be classi­
fied into two types: (l) the acquisition of knowledge or the ascertainment 
of truth by the individual and (2) the acquisition of skills throu^ instruc­
tion or study. In this chuter we are solely concerned with the first 
meaning. The acquisitiœ of skills or technical acumen can be thought of 
as obtaining a stock, X., imich will produce a flow of output x over 
<3 «J 
future time periods. The obtaining of this stock of skills requires 
resources and thus has a price, vdiile the cxrtput has an esqiected dis­
counted price for which it can be sold. Thus, this type of learning can 
be analyzed as the carrying out of a particular ecaaomic activity without 
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a change ia the knowledge set. The following analysis is concerned with 
In the knowledge set. It will be a general approach which does 
not delve into the specific psychological aspects of stimulus-response or 
cognitive learning theory, but is compatible with both. 
A first approach toward this goal is to view the individual as having 
a probability distribution over all possible product-activity relation­
ships and a probability distribution over all possible activity-drive 
relations. 
Hie sets W* and X* can be defined as all possible activities and all 
possible goods and services, respectively. In cases where a good has not 
yet come into existence or is no longer produced then the individual would 
assign a probability of zero (or near zero) to the expectation of that 
particular good servicing; an activity. Kie situation is similar in the 
case of activities ^ ich are unknown or no longer available to the individ­
ual. 
A "probability distribution" over commodity-activity relations and 
over activity-drive relations is meant to correspond objectively and theo­
retically to the subjective set of beliefs lAich the individual has at any 
point in time. Even thou^ probeibility distributed utility functions have 
often been used to test and esqtlain stochastic behavior in various psycho-
1 logical experiments^ this interpretation is certainly not the only one nor 
the one which will be followed here. In the theoretical models developed 
below the goal is to extract and simplify the most Important aspects of the 
general format of the learning process as interpreted by the various models. 
^or example. Luce (1959) and others. 
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The empirical pheaomeaa which impioge upon the iadLividual within his 
erivi^ocisiervt csn te srbitrsrily gl^sifïed as processes which yield specific 
outcomes and those which yield random or variable outcomes. For example, 
pounding a stake with a sledge hammer with a specified force throu^ soil 
of a given density could yield a deterministic outcome. On the other hand, 
the process of flipping a coin would result in a variable outcome of heads 
or tails depending upon, the bias of the coia.^ %e first classification 
is the idealized situation of no random elements entering the process 
while the second would tend to correspond to any actual real world situa­
tion. In the following analysis both types of processes will be considered 
and their degree of variability specifically included. 
A similar classification of individual actions based upon tne decision 
calculus can be made, i.e., those decisions which specify a fixed set of 
activities to be undertaken and those which specify some set of activities 
to be carried out at random. Once the specific activity process is 
analyzed the random activity process follows with a slight theoretical 
extension. Therefore it will be assumed initially that the calculus 
process results in deterministic behavior even though the beliefs of the 
individual are not known with certainty. 
The subjective probability of any particular aspect of the knowledge 
set is defined as the degree of belief in that particular facet. Having 
experienced an amount of empirical evidence, observations of real world 
phenomena, the individual will form opinicms as to what, in fact, is 
happening. From a complex of perceptions, the individual must separate 
^Obviously, there is arbitrary line separating these two sets. 
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the 'aoise' or the irrelevant aspects from the important, determining 
forces in environment. Given this information he will forottlate 
subjective probatilities as to what empirical relations are in fact true, 
nearly ture, false, or simply unimportant. With the advent of additional 
evidence these subjective probability distributions would be altered in 
a manner consistent with the general postulate of Bayesian probability 
theory.^ 
It should be stressed that these subjective probabilities need not 
conform to an objective definition based on frequency. As stated by 
Jeffreys (I96I): 
"The essence is that no probability, direct, prior, 
or posterior, is simply a frequency. The fundamental in­
dex is that of a reasonable degree of belief, lAich satis­
fies certain rules of consistency and can in consequence 
of these rules be formally expressed by numbers by means 
of the addition rule, in itself is a convention.... 
In many cases the numezdcal assessment is the same as that 
of a corresponding frequency, but that does not say that 
the probability and frequency are the same thing even in 
these cases. Ibe equations of heat conduction and diffusion 
have the same forms, but that does not make heat a vapor. 
The approach developed below is to specify a set of axioms of learn­
ing and preference behavior which imply probability theory so that such 
behavior can be stated and analyzed as such. 
General literature on Bayesian statistics would include, among 
several others, Jeffreys (1961), Kyburg and Smokier (1964), Savage (195^), 
Schlaifer (1959), and Fellner (1965). See especially Fellner for a re­
view of the development of Bayesian probability theory from Keynes and 
Hamsay to the present alcxig with his own application and analysis of the 
maximization process. For more recent develojpments of Bayesian probabil­
ity theory see Raiffa and Schlaifer (I968) and Good (1965). 
^Jeffreys (1961, p. 572). 
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If a person at time t believes A more strongly thaa tie believes B, 
ths de^scrl^^tiOQ; of this set of beliefs can be formalized, ia the 
following way. 
Define the following terms: 
A * a proposition 
A = not A 
AAB = A and 5 both — 
AUB = either A or B or both 
^ A^ = a collection of propositions 
^Aj^= a propositional range if and only if exactly one of A^ is 
true 
V = "believed to be at least as likely as" 
The following properties are assumed to guide raticxial benavior: 
1. Transitivity 
A > B ,  B  X  C= ^  A  X  C, wh e r e  =  "im p l i e s "  
2. A >B=»B^ A 
5. There exist upper and lower bounds to degrees of belief, T and F 
T > A ^  F 
k. If AAC = 0 = false set, i.e., A and C cannot both occur, and 
if BAG = 0, and 
if A > B, then 
AUC > B«C 
5. Mditivity 
If ARB = e 
then P(AtfB) = P(A) + P(E) 
Ô5 
P(A) + P(ï) = 1 
PfA) > 0 
P is a fuuctioa idhioh maps the proposition into the set of real 
aumbers /O, ^  and has the property that P(A^) > P(Aj ) if and only if A^ 
X A.. 
— J 
6. Inference: the implementation of new evidence 
PCA/B) . #1 
Graphically o can be interpreted in the figure below. Given that B is 
true then the individual's beliefs can be reduced from ^ to inside the set 
where B is true. 
Pig. 4.1, Graphical representation of inference. 
In Model 4.1 these axioms will be ^ plied to consumer b^avior. The 
individual is viewed as a hypothesis tester specifically forming his set 
of beliefs (or the probabilities wich he attaches to the proposition that 
an activity will fulfill a particular drive or that a product will fulfill 
an activity) according to his past experiences. It will also be assumed 
that the individual selects seme criteria, also dependent upon past experi­
ences, as to lAether he will carry out an activity and the associated 
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commodity exchanges or whether he will gather more information before doing 
anythlzig^ These criteria are» of course > subject to the various constraints 
and exigencies under which he is operating. 
In other words, the decision to act upon the basis of one's beliefs 
at time t depends upon vâiether for i or the propositional range ^ Asunder 
consideration, P(A^) > where PQ is the criterion for sufficient infor­
mation to act. If for all i,P(A^) < P^, the decision criteria would 
specify that no action with respect to the propositional range be under­
taken until for some i,P(A^) > P^. Again the specific criteria and PQ 
level depends upon past experiences with decision making and also the 
importance and relevance of the propositional range in question. 
For purposes of mathematical clarity and without any loss in gener­
ality, it will be assumed that for each propositional range of possible 
product-activity relations (or activity-drive) relations, represented by 
K, ..., A 1, where A. is the proposition that TT (X )(or 0. (w)) is a true X i s i 
relation between a product set X (or activity set W) and activity w. (or 
n ® 
drive reduction S), that Z P(A. ) = 1, lAiich simply normalizes the various 
i=l 1 
probabilities. Intuitively one of the propositions. A., can be thought of 
as any coUecticm of particular functioas. For example, could repre­
sent the propositiw that the relation between and x^ is linear with 
slope = oc and intercept = 0, lAile A^ could represent the class of all 
other linear functions with the parameters not equal to e, 0, lAiile 
represents the class of all quadratic Amctions^ and Aj^ all other possible 
functions. 
Graphically, the individual's state of belief in the case of three 
elements of a propositional range can be represented as a point in an 
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equilateral, triangle vbere the perpendicular diatance from the point to 
each cf the bases of th'? triKng^le is equivalent to the probability that 
each proposition is true. If the point representing the state of belief 
is in any vertex, one proposition is known with certainty while all others 
are known with certed.nty to be false. Similarly if the point lies along 
any of the bases, then the probability of one proposition being true is 
equeO. to zero lAile the sum of the other two equals one. 
In Figure k.2 such a situation is presented %diere point x represents 
the case %6iere P(A^) = P(Ag) = P(A^) = l/n = i/5. The dashed lines repre­
sent a decisicm criterion of 1/2. In other words, if the decisim criteri-
oa is equal to 1/2, the point representing the state of belief must be out­
side the dashed triangle efg. 
From this graphical representation it is obvious that nay experience 
vector must be symmetric (where the experience vector is a vector of empiri­
cal data which results in altering the individual's state of belief). Tbat 
is, if the probability of increases from l/n then P(A^) < l/n for at 
least one i. Likewise if P(A^) > 1/2, then the P(Aj) < 1/2 for all j ^  
i and £ P(A.) = 1 - P(A.). 
Pages 86-87 set forth the theoretical structure of Model 4.1 in mathe­
matical symbols and. is identical to Model 5*2 with the exception of equa­
tions 17-20 aa. page 87. Again drives are postulated as being the sole 
motivating force in determining the activities selected by the maximizing 
unit under two ccxistraints: time and a budget restriction. 
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p(Aa = 1, : O, KV % 0 
Pig. 4.2. Graphical representatioa of all possible probability 
mixtures among three propositions. 
Model 4.1 
Define: 
1. S* » set of drives 
2. T:S*—»R 
5. W* = set of activities 
4. W* = "eccaiomic" activities 
5. W*c.»» 
6. = "other" activities 
7. aw** = Jli¥iv* = e = null set 
8. W:W4f#— 
9. X* a set of commodities 
10. X:X*— 
11. P = (P^, ..., P^) » given price vector 
12. ÎTiX-^W 
15. 0:W—^R, lAere 0 « ji* . (T, were 0*:W—^S*, ^:S*—•R 
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lit-. j/:W—»T 
16. T * time used, » maximum time available 
M m ffimey balaa.ces> = maximum value of money balances 
let £ be ail a-dimensioaal vector which adequately describes oae's 
past experiences idiich would include, for example, p&ist commodities 
selected with the corresponding activity units which resulted and past 
activities indulged in with the consequent drive reduction which occurred. 
Presumably E would also describe all imaginary experiences as well, such 
as imagining the status that a diamond would provide. 
17. P(0(v)/E) = degree of belief that 0(W) is true given past 
experience, E 
18. P(jr(X)/E) * degree of belief that f (X) is true given past 
experience, E 
19. P(E /0(W))= degree of belief that experiences of drive reduc-
® tion as described by E could occur given that 
0(W) is true * 
20. P(E /r(X))= degree of belief that e3Q)eriences of activities 
could occur given that JT(X) is true 
Prom Bayes theorem the new degree of belief in 0(W) after an experi­
ence is given by (21), lAiere P' is posterior probability or the post-
experience degree of belief.^ 
21. p'(0(w)).  nm^ )) ' m^ ))— 
y>(E/0(W)) . P(0(w)) d0(w) 
^^es theorem is really nothing more than the mathematical state­
ment of conditional probability as illustrated in Figure %.l. 
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Similarly the posterior probability attached to Xix.) depends upon 
past experiences as given, in (22) « 
22. p.(Kx)) . 
. pcîtcx)) drcx) 
In Model 4.1 0(K) and )^(X) are to be interpreted as propositions. 
0(W) is the proposition that the "true"^ relationship between activities 
and drives is expressed by the functional form 0. Likewise JTCX) is the 
proposition that the true relationship between products and activities 
is expressed by the functional form îT. 
In order to fix ideas more firmly, consider a typical Bayesian 
example interpreted in learning terms. Suppose that the flipping of a 
coin is defined as an activity, w. Satisfaction or drive reduction re­
sults when a head e^pears. Therefore the relation between S and w is 
dependent upon %Aiere X. is the parameter of the coin lAich is un­
known. If the coin were a fair caie X = 1/2, but all that is known for 
tJ^P(\)dX = 1. certain is that 0 < X < 1 and tha  
— — o 
Suppose E, or experience, is composed of m heads and n tails out of 
m+n trials. Therefore P(E/x) = 
By Bayes theorem the individual will have a different probability 
distribution over the possible values of \ as; 
P-(VE) -
• P{EA)à\ 
^"True", meaning the rational perception of real phenomena given all 
information or what is ten^d perfect knowledge. 
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Since the individual has no other experience to bias his estimation 
of P(\)> assume that as \ varies from 0 to i> P(\) is coastaat,^ then: 
p.(x/E) . — 
PWy?(E/x) . ax _/''T(EA)ax 
o o 
Since P(E/x) = \ (l-\)^, then: 
P.(VE) . f 
Jf \®(1 - \)^ÛK 
The a posteriori expected value of the parameter is: 
P'(head) = (l - X) dX 
* J > ^ { 1  - X)'^dX 
o 
= ntli* B(B»,n) = Beta Amotion. 
Since B(m,n) = ' ^ere/'(m) = Gamma function 
and/*(m) = (ffl-l)i if m » interger > 1, then 
(m<-l)i ni 
P- (-««a) . . 
(m+n+l) ; 
regardless of the actual value of X. From this result several interest­
ing observations can be noted. Firstly, if m is thought as the number of 
successes out of m+n trials then the acpected value of a success converges 
to the frequency of successes out of the total number of trials. Secondly, 
if two people agree as to number of successes verses failures then 
^or greater detail of this implementaticm of the Bayes postulate see 
the Appendix to Chapter IV. 
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their estimates of the probability distribution of the parameter vill 
regardless of how their initial or prior probability estimates 
differed. Thirdly, even thouj^i the above example is of a specific random, 
process, i.e., even if the parameter of the coin is known with certainty 
the outcome is still variable, the mathematical analysis will apply to 
other processes as well. Biis will be further developed belov. 
As another example of the learning process and its effects on the 
calculus of the individual, suppose that there is one activity, v, and the 
individual is indifferent in his beliefs about three fùnctiwal relation­
ships, 0^, 0g, 0^, and also feels that all other possible functional forms 
are not the correct relatiaa or are irrelevant. Thus his a priori beliefs 
would be written as: 
P(0l(W)) = 1/5 
P(02(W)) = 1/5 
P(0^(W)) = 1/5 
P(0i(w)) = O, i > 5 
Also assume that he believes that W will provide one unit of drive reduc­
tion to the extent that 
P(Eg/0^(W» . 1/2 
P(EJ0^(W)) = 1/5 
P(Eg/0^(W)) = 1/4 
Subsequent to selecting one unit of activity W the individual finds that 
Eg = 2, or that two units of drive réduction occurred, then this new degree 
of belief in 0^(W) is found by Beges formula: 
P-(0,(W)) = • V? g g—. # 
(1/2) . 1/3 * (1/5) • 1/3 + (lA) • 1/3 
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Similarly for 
— • i 
wzr • V3 * (i/>r . V) (iA) - i/j 
f(0,(w)) 2 • V? g . 
^ (1/2)^ . 1/5 + (1/5) . 1/5 + (1/i»-) . 1/5 
In general, then, it is possible to view the decision making process 
in the foUoving manner. For each relation to be determined for use in 
the personal calculus process, assume that the individual selects one 
function from a given prqpositionsl rang^. For exemplary purposes con­
sider the selection of a functicm f for an economic activity, v.. 
J 
From the prepositional range 
lAere S^C |l, , for all i, thus represents a particular 
bundle of commodities, the individual must select one ^  in order to plan 
on undertaking activity Since by definitiai, at most one of the 
propositions in the above prepositional range can be true, then the indi­
viduals degree of belief in each Y.iX. ) can be expressed as: 
i Sj_ 
m 
A i jfi ' " 
P(E/X% (Xg )) i = 1, m« 
Thus, ^^ « the degree of belief in the s^ combinaticM of goods providing 
activity output according to the parameters of Y., where i ranges over all 
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possible fuuctioaal forms; aad>^^ = the degree of belief that an experi­
ence, as dsfincd by E, tjIII resiilt givet» ^(X^) is ia fact true and ih coa-
sideration of the vicissitudes of nature and the capriciousness of the 
human sensory processes. 
For each experience vector, E, there would be in general a different 
for each YT(X^ ). %us interpreted, can be thought of as the proba­
bility that K (X ) is true and (l - f. ) is the probability that (X ) is i S^ ci ^ 
false. On the other hand, y#could be intuitively thought of, although 
not necessarily, as the frequency which E will result if IT. (X ) is true 
i 
or as how often an individual will perceive E if (X ) is true. If the 
^ ®i 
individual suffers from no changes or variability in perceptive powers, 
then P{E/jr(Xg )) = - 1. If this is the case and P(>^(X^ )) = 
P(jr.{X )) for all i and j, then the individual will never alter his beliefs. 
In general, then, starting from a condition of ignorance, i.e., 
)) » P(%](Xg)) for all i and j and where PCE^r^CX^) < 1, 
with the strict inequality holcLing for at least one i, and assuming a fin­
ite number of discreet possible jT's,^ then, 
(1) P ' ( r ( x j / B . )  1 s" J' n j 
L /*! 
i=l 
With Azrther experience the degrees of belief are altered 
further as: 
^erhfiç>s corresponding to the psychologist's just noticeable dif­
ference (j.n.d), if the range of each of the IT functions is"continuous. 
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( S )  „  j  1 -—1 
^ vff 
(5) p^(Y:(x_)/E,_) 
i.l " E/fY 1.1 
rT/«r 
1=1 k=l ^ 
Over time the process of learning can be pictured as in Figure 4.5, 
where )^(Xg) is the true relation and the learning process is cwisistent. 
The path of the degree of belief in the true relabitm, path 1, approaches 
the certainty axis, where P(K (X^)) = 1, depending upon the nature of the 
ytt^'Sf lAile the belief in all other relations ^proaches P(V^(X^)) = 0, 
or a path similar to 2. 
tmw** 
Fig. 4.). Path of the probability of a functicm over time. 
The subjective determination of the ' s of each experience depend 
upon the estimaction process of the individual and to some extent the degree 
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of analogiziog; be does between one particular activity-product relation, 
srid ether relaticsis in his environment» For example* suppose that the 
individual has severaLL actual observations upon which he ran a mental 
linear least squares regression. Given the estimated parameters for the 
linear equatiŒi and their associated standard deviations he could then 
evaluate the probability of any further observation of being predicted by 
the model. That is suppose the linear regression gives: 
w = a + bx +6,e'»^(0, r^) 
and using w = a + bx in the calculus process x* vas purchased and w* 
resulted lAiere 
w* = a + bx* + € * 
Dividing by the standard deviation estimate for the proba­
bility of C* is easily obtained from standard normal probability tables. 
In fact, for each relation in the propositional range %diich 
has an assumed random element distributed normally with mean 0 and 
variance of if YT(X ) represents the deterministic portion of K (X ) 
X X S X S 
then the experience of w* = JT (x*) = ^ (w*) + 8^* . Therefore 
2 
p ( B j / i r i ( x ^ ) )  ' X  ' ^ - 7 ^  J  ^  
O 
Clearly, if £* = 0, i.e., if the results of purchased bundle of commodities 
were exactly as expected, then = 1. In general, however, experience 
would not be limited to only actual observations but would include 'imag­
ined" observations lAich result from reading books, talking to others, 
advertising, and so forth. Also, it would seem reasonable that the indi­
vidual would wei^t these observations thasselves differently. That is. 
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an. actual observation would carry more weigjat in the estimation process 
»»> lm»or>r>»4 <*5rrv^T*ienoe>. 
In addition, the estimation procedure for any single individual 
would necessarily be a rough approximation to the above discussion. The 
estimates could be linear or quadratic or e:qponential or %Aiatever. The 
point is, that each experience B. can be evaluated subjectively by the 
J 
individual as to the probability that it resulted from a given function 
in the propositional range. 
For example, suppose that^'^ is constant in equation 5, page 93, 
as k goes from 1 to m. In other words, suppose each experience is the 
same And the individued associated the same probability to each respec-
tive function after each successive experience. 
Then equation 3 simplies to 4, 
W na nr 
^ . +1^... * A) 
Mi' 
In addition to the standard regressicai techniques of estimating the 
probability of a particular e:q)erience being given by a specified relation, 
there are many other wagrs in lAich this estimate could be derived. For 
example, suppose that each proposition in the propositional range under 
investigation is deterministic and is viewed as being controlled by a 
parameter as to whether it is a correct relation or not. In other 
words, could be thought of as the frequency ^ ich proposition i is the 
correct one.^ 
^IFurther discussion of this approach is given in the Appendix to 
Chapter IV. 
96 
If ttie individual can classify every experience, E^, as containing 
t units of successes %><! r units of faiixires with respect to K CX, ), 
J •) -
then for experience is equal to (l - Further from (>), 
page 95> 
ci -
i=l k=l ^ 
Also if the are constant as Is. goes from 1 to m then the above reduces 
to the coin-tossiog case where 
\ (l - oc = £ t , 
or that oc = total number of successes over all experiences and g = total 
number of failures over all ejqoeriences. 
With the individual as with the scientist, it is often not necessary 
to establish the exact ftmcticmal relation between goods and activities or 
between activities and drives. All that is necessary is a sufficient 
approximation considering the costs of establishing the form and parameters 
of functional -relations more precisely. 
Since each functional relation predicts an outcome, i.e., if 
* * 
is w^ = ax^ + bXg, the for some quantities Xg a definite level of w^ 
is determined, the actual outcome can be evaluated in terms of units of 
success and units of failure as to how close the postulated (X^) pre­
dicted the actual outcome. In other words, evaluating an experience in 
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terms of relative successes aad feu.lures is a proxy for a more detailed 
szid scphletlcatsd. forsi Qf estimation Essentially this describes 
the estimaticaa process as analogous to the ascertainmeat of the parameter 
of a coin. 
In general the level of upon which the decision criteria are based 
would depend upon the difficulty associated with the calculation of 
as well as the additional value of a more finely tuned e^proximation to 
reality. There is a trade-off between the drive enhancement associated 
with more intricate calculation and the drive reducticsi associated with a 
function -vriaich has a greater degree of belief. For example, a linear 
function would be acceptable at a lower degree of belief than would a 
third-degree polynomisLL. 
However, for purposes of simplicity and clarity in understanding the 
basic forces at work in the specified models, it will be assumed that the 
drive enhancement of calculating the various relevant functions is the 
same. This allows the decision criterion to be based solely upon the 
degree of belief of a function. Also it will be assumed again that there 
is some acceptable level of belief below which no functionaLL relationship 
will be selected, viz., P^. 
Previously it was postulated that the individual selects a decision 
criterion onlhe basis of past experiences. Or in other words, if 
P(%L (Xg)/E) > P^ then the individual "acts as if" P( 1^(X^)/E) = 1. If 
is in fact true and P(%T(Xg)/E) > P^, then the value of further 
understanding of the relations of the real world are not relevant to the 
welfare of the individual aside from the aesthetic or academic values. 
This of course assumes that the worldly environment is unchanging or that 
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the true relatioa, ^T. (X ), is static. While this may be a reasonable 
apprcxisiaticn, to sspects of the reel HOrM especially since ^  refers 
to a specific bundle of goods, and this degree of constancy can be 
arbitrarily finely delineated, many other relationships are in a continual 
state of flux. 
Thus for the discussion of the types of knowledge change two types 
will be covered: (l) the forming of an opinion and (2) the altering of an 
opinicm. In case 1 the problem is in to get one relation )T(X^) into the 
position where P(J^(X^)/E) > PQ, on the assumption that ^ (X^) is true. 
In case 2 the analysis will evaluate the process of proceeding from 
P(rj(Xg)/EQ) > Pq, P(^(Xg)/EQ) < Pq to where P(r^(X^)/E^) < P^, 
P(%^(Xg)/E^) > PQ. Biese types of a change in the knowledge set in both 
cases will be analyzed by two methods of change: (l) the more general 
analysis where ^ is given by any manner, and (ll) where is determined 
on the basis of the relative amounts of successes and failure associated 
with each experience. By concentrating on the change in the functional 
relations, all changes in the knowledge set can be included. Estimation 
of the ftmctional relations necessarily includes the estimation of not 
only the form but also the parameters and thus, the range of commodities 
and activities \diich are available. 
In cases 1.2 and II.2 it will be assumed that the individual begins 
with a wrong opinicHi, i.e., P(Vr(Xg)/EQ) > Pq, and the subsequent experi­
ences are consistent in lowering P(YL(X )) and in increasing the value of d 8 
P(]r (X ) ) so that after some period of time t. (X ) is replaced in the 
i S j s 
calculus process by (X^). %e speed and efficiency of this process will 
depend in part upon the resources utilized and the degree of perfectness 
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of each experience. A perfect experience in cases I.l and 1.2 will be 
defined = 1 for VTCX )- vMle % nerfeot exoerience in cases II. 1 
J J Sj 
and II.2 will be defined as one where if t is the number of units of suc­
cess and r is the number of units of failures in an e3Q)erience, then r = Q 
and t corresponds to something lAiich might be called the intensity of the 
experience. 
In addition assume that is fixed by a wealth of other experience 
and remains constant thrwghout the learning process with respect to 
In cases I.l and 1.2 the posterior probability of each can be 
directly determined once the and the prior densities are known. In 
cases II. 1 and II.2 the estimati(m process gives the entire distribution 
of the parameter The expected value of each will determine whether 
or not is used in the decision making process. Although basing decision 
criterion cm the expected "truth" or the expected value of rather than 
on, say, the variance of the statistic&il distribution established seems to 
be a bit restrictive, but in this simplified case the variance is inversely 
related to the mean for a given number of units. That is for any tot Gil 
number of successes «"d failures the closer the expected value if to 1, 
the lower is the variance.^ 
^r units of success and t units of failures give an expected value 
of Xj^, from a condition of ignorance (see page 89) of ^ ^^2 * vari-
-
**0 
(footnote continued on next page) 
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Case I.l 
sqsstlcc 'i, psge 94^ » e?f3»?iences result ia 
i M i f  
ik) AtjCX^ )/E ) . a , for i . 1, .... ». 
'  £  ( X f )  
i»l 
vhea it was assumed that the individual started from a coaditioa of ignor­
ance, defined as P(%^) « ^ , for all i, J = 1, n, and each of 
the m experiences were equal and resulted inyit f as the evaluation of 
with respect to fUncticaa JT. 
(footnote continued from previcxis page) 
Pir + 3)nt + 1) (r + 2) It.' 
° ' - - <r iWlWÂ . 2 
P{r + t + 2) (r-+ t + l)i 
\2 
(r + t + 2)^ (r + t + 2)^(r + t + 5) 
_2 (r + l)(r + 2) (r + l) (r + l)(t + l) 
- (r A > )((r + t\ a) -  ^/ 
If r, t have the following values, the expected value varies as the rela­
tive proportions between r and t vary but flT^ depends inversely on the 
mean for r + t = constant. 
r t r+t 
1 1 2 1/2 1/20 
2 2 4 1/2 1/28 
2 1 5 3/5 1/25 
5 0 5 2/3 2/75 
3 1 U 2/5 2/63 
5 2 5 V7 3/98 
h 1 5 5/7 5/196 
5 0 5 6/7 3/196 
= the probability that experience could have resulted from 
equation or functional relation V^. Thus j is a superscript referring to 
a particular experience. If the experiences are constant for m times^^ 
in (4) is raised to the mïÈ power. 
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With this iafonaatioa> oae can, determine the value of m or the number 
:=.RR-î; = . R : . - ^ ^ = . Î R  — " T C  I . 2 2 D Î 2 5 L I ?  S .  ! * >  T H E  C S L ICUIUS PROCGSS. For 
J 
iC(X ) to be included it is necessary that 1 s 
I^(jr(X )/B. ) > P_ =t minimum level for (X ) to be included 
s j+m - 0 the felicific calcuîus. 
Therefore, 
(%) 
n . _ — 0 
E ( j U p  
i=l 
?(4) 0 k=l\^^/ 
> P_ results in the criterion that 
k f é i  
after slight algebraic manipulation. Numerically, let = .9, K = 2, 
= .9, yffg = .8, the for ÎT^ to be selected and used over it is 
necessary that 
i# 2 
or m > 18.7. Thus only after I9 experiences, E^, of qualitywould 
be used, that is %^(Xg)) = -905 > -9 = Pq-
If the successive experiences are such that the probability ^ associ­
ated with each fïmction changes the algebraic manipulation is more complex 
but the result is analogous. Hie total number of experiences required would 
vary as the probability ygf ^  varied. 
Case II.1 
Assume %^(Xg) is true and P(Jf^(X^) < P^, for suLl i and there exist n 
relevant functional relations which the individual feels may be true. 
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j = 1, n. Each has some degree of truth and thus an 
associated degree of belief. Start from a position where for each j = 1, 
.n, is unknown,; but by definition 0 < < 1, ^  P(\^)d\j = 1. 
Assume a rectangular distribution over each 0 < < 1» 
Assume an initial arbitrary experience is given; then for each 
yT(X ), j = 1, .n, the individual can define r,, t. as the respective 
J s J J 
degree of success that the actual experience fulfills the experience dic­
tated by Ô ~ 1; • • ••> J s 
If is true and assuming that the effort involved in calcula­
ting lf.(X } is equal for all J, then r > r , j^i and t. < t , j^i . J S I J X J 
Thus jj^i. 
r + 1 
To attain the desired criterion level, PQ, t + 2 he greater 
than PQ. If not, then no decision is made until additional information is 
obtained. Let r^, t^ be the second experience vector and P' = probability 
after the first experience, P" » probability after the second experience, 
then since. 
P'(\/E) = , 
y^(E/\) . P(x)dx 
r, t 
r^ t. ^ 
r t 
y -X (l-X) dx 
(l_x) 2 1 
; 1:— ' 
rh. 2 (i-x)  ^ X ^(i-x) ^ 
O 1 r^ t-
y X (l-x) dX 
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f\ (i-X) ^  X (1-X) ax /\ (1-x) - ^dX 
^ o  o 
* ^2 * ^ 
The expected value of \ after two experiences is B^(\) « ^ —57-g 
which is the same form as. the expected value of \ after oae experience in 
that the expected value depends only upon the relative amounts of successes 
versus failures. 
For example, since r+l>PQ(r+t + 2) is a necessary condition for 
a decision, suppose = .9> then 
r + 1 > .gr + .9t + 1.8 
.Ir > .9t + .8 
or r must be greater than 9t + 8. 
Q3ie conclusion of Case 11.1 under the assumption is that the degree 
of success relative to the degree of failure must be as given in (l) below 
of the decision to be implemented. 
m = total number of successes 
P^ Cn + 2) - 1 
(1) m > —rr ZT—r n = total number of failures 
- U - Pq) 
Thus for the decision criteria to be reached if r., t. are constant for 
each experience, then 
• 
Only if (2) holds for each experience, j, will the learning process 
surpass t;ie decision criterion P^ in a monotonie manner. For example, if 
Pq = .9 t.ien r^ must be greater tnan 9t^ in order tnat for some combination 
LOU 
of experiences, Er. = m, Zt. = n, m is equal to or greater tuan 
J J 
P^Cn + 2) - 1 
(1 - ^o> 
Case 1.2 
Assume: 
(1) Y^(Xg) is true 
(2) There exist n relevant functioas waica tue iadividual feels may 
be true, ÎT (X ), k = 1, ..., a. 
(5) Initially 
P(»^(X,)) - Pq > I 
< Pq k = 1, n; k / 2 
If tiie wrong opinion, were created as given in the analysis of 
case I.l, then 
i ° 
1 - P n />rn 
— * Z I —r| , were m = tne number of constant previous 
0 k=l\//^/ 
k^2 . m 
( / f p  
experiences, E., and also tuen P^( K (X )) . In order taat 
k=l 
^(X^) replaced by k^(Xg) it is necessary tnat P^^^C J^(X^)) > P^ and 
P^^((1(X )) < P wnere P_ < ^  and K(X )) is tne probability that 
^8 U V C X S 
llT(X^) is true after m + r esqperiences. 
Therefore if we assume a new experience occurs, R^, where novytf^, > 
jttgi and further that is constant for several iterations, then the 
lût? 
i.umUtr or experleaces necessary to replace witu cati ve 
After one new experience, tne probability of beinjj true 
as: a t m 
h\n . m 
n . m 
E (Mir 
k=l 
Therefore, if 
1^" W -2 Po 
(X) 
k=l 
taen after slight manipulation it follows that 
1 - Po ^  (^ J)° 
="o 
For a numerical example similar to case I.l let: = .9, k = 2, m = 19, 
/fg = -y, = -ci, tnen 
P^^(î^) = .W) 
,1^( 
If is sucn that= .9, t&en 
= .097 
. h , ..h 
^0 (.8)^' (.9)' \ 
iOi. 
Solving, r > 10.9, or after 11 nev experiences will be re-
d in. t:zs czloiiltzs process >;y f 
Although tt.e assumptions of the cases presented above greatly simplify 
tue algebraic and numerical examples, the basic forces and intuitive ideas 
remain. That is, similar and analogous results could be derived if one 
were to relax the assumption tnat the P(E./^(X )) were constant 8uad tnat 
,j 1 S 
Ej was also constant, aoever tne algebraic conditions would be more complex. 
Also more complex numerical examples can be easily worked wita no change 
in tne essense of ttie argument. 
Case 11.2 
Assume: 
(1) Tr(X^) is true. 
(2) Tnere exist n relevant functions whicn the individual feels may 
be true, k = 1, —, n. 
(5) Begin from a position where for each k, is unknown for 
certaiin but, 
E (Xj =/^X P(r(X ))dX = p 
X a J J s .J o 
^ k = 1, n; k 5^ .j 
P^Ct + 2) - 1 
If this informaticxi were formulated as in Case I, tne r. = 5—r 
^ o' 
^From tne results of Case I.l, one would expect tngt if 5^ just^ 
reversed the profcstbilities of and jCfg sucu that = .9 and yff ^  = .8 
that r > 3Ô, i.e., it would take l^E^ experiences to reduce things to there 
original level of ignorance and I9 more to make P(y^(X )) > PQ and, in fact 
tnat is the case. 
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P^(t, + 2) - 1 
^ < °(i - Pg) 
Then, with additional experience it is necessary that the equality becomes 
P (t^ * 2 )  . 1  
and inequality, r. < 5-«c , and for ith relation that 
J ()/ 
1 + 2) - 1 
> (x . p ) > 
< ^0^^ + g) - 1 ^ all k ^  i, j, wbere represent 
accumulated experience. 
The learning process will smoothly converge to the assumed correct 
relationship after a sufficient number of experiences as long as 
T Vi T Po(4 + 2) - 1 
r. > -7? ^ for each T, and r < ri* = for each T, with the 
^ ^ 0 \ 0 
strict inequality holding for at least one T < n = the number of experi-
P^(t. + 2) - 1 1 
ences necessary for r^ > _ p ^ 
Cases I.l, 1.2, II.1, and II.2 have analyzed the evaluation and 
selection of the various product-activity relations utilized in the 
+ 2) - 1 . 
^This theory of learning developed here is quite compatible with 
much empirical work which has been done in psychology. For example, the 
approaches used in experimental psychology, those lAich entail a learning 
model which postulates that empirical observaticHi of a subject moving 
from, say, an unconditicsied state to a conditioned state is based on some 
probability, are perfectly conformable to the abovQ theory. For examples 
see Suppes and Ginsberg (19^3) > Atkinson and Estes in Dice, Bush, and 
Galanter (1964) Vol. II, Myers and Atkinson {196^), and Kraemer (1964). 
In this form of experimentaleo^iricism the "correct" versus "incorrect" 
responses are assumed known by the observers, while here the correctness 
of any set of beliefs depends solely upon the Individual.. 
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iadividusd's calculus process. Similar arguments would hold for the other 
relations used in the maximizing procedure except taat rather than a deci­
sion criterion, the individual would simply select the best relation, 
i.e., the one with the highest probability. 
As time passes for the individual the felicific csLlculus process etnd 
the learning process etre segregated. Given an initial set of relations 
assumed to be true, the individuel maximizes drive reduction for the next 
period, t, by carrying out a set of activities (W^). These activities be­
come experiences vdiich are evaluated as their probability or as to their 
success or failure to meet the expectations generated by the calculation 
process. This addition information alters the degree of beliefs in the 
various relations and a subsequent calculation is undertaken in view of 
altered relations and other changed parameters in the environment, e.g., 
prices. In Model U.2 the calculus process is specified in mathematical 
symbols in view of the information set available, as defined ar ove. Again 
r 
s = 0(w^, ..., w^) is a surrogate for tne overall calculus J S(t)dt and 
the drive reduction associated with the various activities is discounted 
to present value. 
Model 4.2 
Maximiz.e S = , €i^), 
where: 0^ is such that P(0^) > P(0.) all j ^ i 
and where: w. = Y^(X ), s.Cfl, ..., 
J  J  S . "  J *• 
and V.(X ) is such that pOT.CX )) > P^. 
,} s. ,} s. u 
Subject to: 
k 
Z P.x. < 0 
i=l ^  ^  
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Xi» > 0 for all i 
where 
is such that P( > P() all } ^  i. 
This variable preference model is, in a sense, a two-stage process. 
At any time the calculus process is carried out with the best estimate of 
0 and the best estimate of activity-product relations which meet the 
decision criteria. A subsequent recalculation lAiich, if learning takes 
place, will be determined by using either a different 0 function or 
different IT functions or a different ^ function. 
As a final analysis of Chapter IV, the next model will consider ex­
plicitly the presence of a search activity, w^, which is a known activity 
to the individual, i.e., 
Vg = ) where , 
S 
P ( f ^ ( X ^ J / B )  >  PQ . 
In other words, the individual decides upon some relation between conanodi-
ties and time used in the search activity, w^, viz., )^(X^) and in 
precisely the same way he selects any other relation to be used in the 
calculus process. Let the direct effects of the search activity on drives 
be zero: 
0(Wg) = O, idiere w^ = direct effects of search on drives, 
then 
«""s> = 
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f 
where « the present effect on future activities and currently: 
< ^ 0 I " 1. —' »' 
— X 
^ f 0(w ) = 0(w_-, .is the individual's assumed result of w on the 
knowledge set. That is, each level of is equivalent to some experience. 
After a sufficient amount of eacperience more activities will become known 
so that they can be included in the calculus process and add to the total 
level of drive reducticai. Therefore at any point in time the model becomes: 
Model 1^.5 
Max. S = 0(w^, ..., w^, *n+l' ' *iH-t' ^ 1' * * "'®^nH-l' * * * ' ^nH-r^ 
Subject to: 
k 
Z P.x. < 0 
i=l ^  ^  
*n+i ® ^n+i^*s^' i = t 
* * * ' *n' *^1' f 5 ^0 
w^, *i' for all i. 
If for S*, a constrained maximum, w^ > 0 then the search activity 
will be undertaken until sufficient additi(xial experience alters Model 4. 
It is possible that additicxial experience would be no information which 
would alter and the result might be to teiminste the search activ­
ity, Wg. On&e other hand, the information could be such that the search 
Ill 
activity was much more lucrative than originally perceived and the maxi-
5;ibssyy.szt sclutica. include a higher level of search activ­
ity, Wg. 
Elis step toward a better theory of consumer behavior permits a 
wealth of further analyses in many areas of economic theory. In the fol­
lowing Chapter some direct and obvious applications of Models 4.2 and 4^.5 
and their simplifications will be given in. order to test and evaluate the 
scope and power of such a theoretical extension. 
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CHAPTER V. DIRECT APPLICATIONS^ ANALYSIS, AND EVALUATION 
OF VARIABLE PBEFEKEKCE 
This ch8{>ter is devoted to a farther discussion of the applications 
of the models developed in Chapters III and IV. The intent here is to 
establish the usefulness of sach an approach in the area of eccsiontic 
theory. Since the models have nearly an infinite application, the 
discussion vill be limited to some selected exanples. First, a discussion 
of a programming simulation to the model is given, utilizing techniques 
developed by programming theorists. Following this the remainder of the 
chapter is devoted to particular model evaluations of educaticKi and 
advertising using variable preferences and concludes vith a development 
of general efficiency and evaluaticmal criteria vith a final discussion 
of technical change previously presented in Chapter III. 
Model 4.) is, in general, a nonlinear programming model where, as the 
individual progresses over time, the parameters of the various equations 
are subject to variation. Since a substantial amount of vork has been 
done in this area of parametric change in programming prdblens, some of 
these methods could be applied to Model 4.5 or to a variation of Model 4.). 
As an example of the heretofore established dynanic process of 
calculation, learning, recalculation, additiOTad learning, and so on, 
assume that 0 can be ^ proximated by a p degree polynomial in the n + m 
variables (w^, ..., where the ith term would be of the 
form: 
k 
m 
vhere k. > 0 and 
J -
11) 
n+itt 
E k. < p and a. = coefficient. 
>1 •>- ^ 
For example; if n + at = 2, and p = ), then: 
0 « Oj^w + a^u) + + a^w^ + a^ià^ + a^w^ + a^m^ 
The learning process is now simply to evaluate the coefficients, a^. 
Furthermore, if it is etssumed that p = 1 (the activity-product relations 
are linear) and that|^(w^, ...,6)^) is linear, then the recusive maximiza­
tion process with learning and changing preferences can be ansdyzed in 
terms of sensitivity analysis developed for linear programming problems.^ 
These methods include parametric progranming, perturbation analysis 
stability analysis, and others. This approach could be used to simulate 
the learning-maximization process. The following example works through 
the mathematical properties of such a simulation. 
Model 5.1 
n m 
Maximize: S = Z a.w. + L a..tà. 
i=l ^  ^  i=n+l ^  
let b^jXj = the amount of conanodity j used in activity i 
then w. = rb. xt 
1 j ij J 
n k m 
and S = Z E a.b. .x^ + E &.cà. 
i=i j-i 1 J i=»i ^  
with only the restrictions of tine and budget, S is maximized sul;ject to: 
^or example, see Beckenback (1956), Dantzig (I965), Howard (I960), 
and Vajda (1961) as general references to linear programming analysis. 
Articles specifically concerned with sensitivity analysis would include 
Saaty (1959), Boot (196)), and Sengupta (I966). 
I lk  
n k 
Z Z pb % < 0 
1=1 j=l J J 
n k . m. 
£ 2 c.b. .X. + £ _ < T, 
1=1 j=l 1 j l=a+l ^  ~ ® 
^ Q> 1 — 1> **** kî j • 1* ••«> IB-
By the substitution theorem, S vill maximized equally well by two 
commodities in the above problem if it can be maximized by more than tvo 
commodities. This formulaticHi, of course, takes away many of the more 
interesting a^ects of the problem. For example, the assumption of a 
linear activity-product relation Implies that the Iso-actlvlty line for 
tvo commodities and one activity is linear as shown in Figure $.1. This 
Fig. U.l. Linear activity-product relation. 
in turn n^aas that the optimal activity expansitm path may either lie 
along the axis or the Xg axis depending upon the relative prices of x^ 
and Xg, 
115  ^
Therefore^ io order to incorporate some of these more interesting as-
pects of the prwtfiw of iiiiiviisisi bebsYlOT; the oonstraint set will be 
augioiented so that ve have a linear approximation to the more general non­
linear problem;. 
Let the constraLints be written as 
Bx < d 
lAiere B is an (r x nk+m) matrix and x is an (nkHrm. x l) vector of commodities 
chosen corresponding to the economic and ncmeconomic activities selected, 
d is an (r X l) vector of constraints. Assume that the last row of B and 
X and the rth item in d comprise the time constraint, then in vector nota­
tion the last rov of the ccmstraints would be written as: 
(^l^ir ®1^12' **•' ^ l^lk' ^ 2^21' '^n^nk' °n+r ' 
«à. 
m 
The problem is now a standard lineeir programming problem to find a vector 
X which maximizes the objective function: 
s s a'x lAere the dimensions are: 
subject to: Bx < d x: (nk+m x l) 
X  > 0 a: (l X nk-m) 
B: (r X  nk-m) 
d: (r X  l) 
By introducing r slack variables *nk+nH-r^ and appropri­
ate changes in the dimensionality of a, x, and B, the problem can also be 
Uo 
writtea as: 
under the restrictions: 
Ex = d B: (r x nk+ntt-r) 
X > 0 a,x: (nk+BH-r x l) 
d; (r X l) 
Without loss in generality, sissume that the problem is feasible and 
that every basic feasible solution is nwdegenerate. Partition the vector 
X into two sub vectors (3^) and(x^), were is in the basis and is 
not. Let the confoimable partition o f  matrix B be denoted by g and N. The 
restriction now becomes 
PX^ + îbCjj = d 
and + p"^d, since p is nonsingular by assumption. The ob­
jective functicm can be written as: 
x^ is the optimal basis if and cxily if: 
< 0 
Let SjJ = and = a^ - s^, then a given basis, is optimal if and 
CKily if ^  < 0 for all activities not in the basis. 
Now suppose that the change in the knowledge set alters vector a, 
i.e., alters the wei^ts assigned to products via their activity contri­
butions in the objective function S, such that a becomes a + & a. Then the 
optimally criterion 
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becomes 
It the changes due to the learning process in the values of are 
such that ^  < 0 for All nonbaslc activities, then the old optimal baisis 
remains optimal but the value of the objective function will be changed. 
If, cm the other hand, changes are made in the a^'s of the nohbasic vari­
ables only satisfying < 0, then the old basis remains optimal and there 
is no change in the level of S. If the new knowledge set violates the 
(^timally criterion ^  < 0, then this indicates that an improvement can be 
made in S by bringing in that activity which violates ^  < 0, In these 
cases the value of a change in the knowledge set could be explicitly ascer­
tained and compared. 
This type of parametric programming could be ^ plied to the other 
parameters as well and the effects on the optimal solution of (B, d, a) 
induced by the variations in the parameters (SB, &d, (a) could be evalu­
ated. Also, similar forms of analysis could be carried cut using the 
methods of perturbation analysis, stability analysis, and so forth. How­
ever, it is quite likely that such analysis would be computationally cuite 
expensive at the present time, but this nevertheless represents a broad 
vista for Aiture use. For example, for a given objective function and a 
given information set it could be determined how much resources were 
necessary to alter the information set so that a given conpliment of com­
modities would produce a greater amount of drive reduction. Comparing the 
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drive reduction resulting from, direct activity fulfillment and the drive 
resnltlzî» tro® % ohemge in the parameters Of either the 0 function or 
the various ffunctions^ an efficient use of resources could be made. This 
of course assumes that one could determine a priori the learning %diich 
would occur from a given set of resources. While this may not be an easy 
task, equivalent measures are occurring everyday with respect to both the 
educational systems in the world and the various other forms of persua­
sive activity such as advertising and other types of sales promotion which 
are continually taking place. Presumably in these cases the benefits are 
greater than the costs. Tbe question remains as to lAat extent these bene­
fits diverge from the costs involved.^ For an efficient use of social 
resources, it is necessary that the resources .e^qpended in improving infor­
mation be increased to the point ^ ere the marginal social cost is jut 
equal tolhe marginal social benefit. Objectively one can easily measure 
the cost of resources which go into education under a given price system; 
2 the problem is ascertaining the benefits objectively. By using the model 
^or example with respect to advertising on the part of business 
firms, Doyle (1968b) states, "Ihou@i the firm is conscious that its adver­
tising outlay is a potent and often essential veepcsi for maintaining or 
increasing its sales, it is often impossible for it to decide, even 
approximately, how much it should spend to maximize its long-run profits. 
Bemused or iinasrure of the problem, many firms employ a rule of thumb 
procedxure for deciding the expropriate size, while much of the research 
into the problem has avoided the central goal of profitability and con­
centrated on limited objectives" (p. 59^595)» 
%t should be reiterated that the learning concept as used in this 
chapter deals solely with the ascertainment of the conditions of the world 
ab(xit the individual. This benefit to the individual has been virtually 
Ignored, aside from a passing comnent /e.g., "The value of education 
is far more than financial. . . .Biucation is a vital segoent of the full 
life," (Weisbrod (I966), p. lO)/* by Ijiose sttCTspting to measure the value 
of education, e.g., Becker (1964), Blaug (1967), Schultz (i960). (Also see 
Becker (196%) for his argument (footnote continued on next page) 
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developed here acme insight can be shed upon how this could be done. 
In. CLsptsr IV it ths* >>«^g^r>nir>g from either a position of 
ignorance (i.e. > no function was used in the calculus process) or 
from a position vâxere the individual changed, his opinion, the number of 
experiences necessary to change the knowledge set could be eveLLuated. Hius, 
disregarding the usual public characteristics of resources spent in changing 
knowledge sets the value of education could be cstlculated for the single 
individual as simply the difference in resources necessary to alter the 
knowledge set to achieve a higher level of drive reduction and those neces­
sary to achieve the same level of drive reduction through previously known 
commodity-activity combinations. 
Assume that there are three activities: w^, v^; ^ ere w^ is labor 
and ^ 0/&w^ < 0, while ^ 0/iw^, i0/èw^ > 0, but is unknown, which is 
to say that the expected value of any V^.(x^) is less than P^, the decision 
criterion. GraphicsLlly this is pictured in Figure ^ .2, 
With only w^ and w^ known with sufficient certainty the equilibrium 
solution is at a Figure 5*5> or a'. Figure 5.k. If w^ were known, then 
the solution would be at d in Figure Suppose that there is an in­
crease in productivity such that the individual's satisfaction could be 
increased to by increasing his wage rate ais in Figure 5-5 or alter­
natively by informing him of activity w^. 
The cost of attaining by using more x^ directly is units 
of Now assume that a units of x^ could be used in an educational 
(footnote ccaitinued from preceding page) ^ oui- the rate of psychic re­
turn from eduction.) These measurements of the value of education approach 
it entirely from the investment in capital view or from l.he view of ascer­
taining skills. The model presented here offers a way to measure the 
contribution of education to the "full life." 
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Fig. 5.2. Three activities and three products 
Fig. 5.). Maximum solution with Fig, 5.4. Maximum solution with 
only w^ and w known. w_ w , and w, known. 
-L d ^ y 
Fig. 5.5. Shift in relative prices necessary to attain "by 
activity w^ alone. 
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activity such that would he included in. the calculus process.^ 
1= order for the ^ uoatloaal activity to take place, some of the 
other activities the individual is currently engaged in will have to be 
reduced. In order to maintain focus oa the value of the educational experi­
ence it will be assumed that the drive reduction lost by reducing the 
current activity mix is equal to the drive reduction gained by the infor­
mation process. Mathematically, if w = the current mix of activities, 
then assume that 
[^0/iw| . (l, ..., 1)' = |i0/4w^| , where))is a vector and w^ = 
learning activity. 
Further, if it is assumed that there is only one future time period 
and furthermore that the price of x^ = price of x^. Then the value of 
education is the saving in x^ resources, (x^ - x^) - a; or if x^ - x^ = b, 
then in value terms the value of education is equal to P^(b - a). The 
value for several future time periods is: 
~ t Value of education = b Zt P - a 
t=0 
^f x^ yielded r successes and t fsdlures toward establishing the 
credibility of lP^(x,), and if m = total number of successes and n = 
total number of failures, then 
P (n+2) - 1 
m > — = is a necessary condition 
for the individual to include V^(X^) in his calculus process; and, assuming 
that r and t are constant for each unit of x^ used, then a units of x^^ will 
be necessary for )^(X^) to be believed, where 
S P q - I  
For example, if P. = .75, r = k, t = 1, then a > (1.5 - l)A - 3 - .75) = 
.5/25 = 2, or two units of x^ would be necessary. 
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where future prices P are properly discounted. 
Tn ojçnç-rNgii; the objective valuatiott. ot education could be formulated 
as: 
both. 
(l) S * ^^*1' 
and 
, . 1 .,** *»•»** * 
(2) S a •••* *n+l' i' ""f m 
are possible where 8^ = a particular level of drive reduction, and 
-1 -
(5) 
Q 
and lAere (g) comes about only as a result of education. The value of 
resources used by (l) and (2) respectively: 
{h) Z P^.x^, s = ®ix^ 
ics 
/ > ^ ** ** C "> (5) ^ P^ 7 s — ^2' " ' f  f 
** 3- X' 
its 
Then the maximum value of education is given by the integral (6) over all 
future savings for as long as the edncatitm lasts, T, minus the costs. 
Z P^x^, where e«£l, k^, irtii( ^ - lA ch are the resources used in education. 
ice 
/ f ^ies its ^ (6) ^ £ P^ x^ - Z P^.x^ f dt ' L P.x. = Maximum value of - • ^ ^  education at time t = 0 
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For example, suppose that aa iadividual receives a certain amount of 
ststzs drive ftilfillJEeat tb» purchase of a Cadillac at a cost of $10,000. 
Hxea if the iadividual could be convinced that the same amount of status 
could be achieved by a button, the savings to society would be the dif­
ference between each $10,000 that this individual would have spent over 
his lifetime and the cost of the buttons plus the cost of the education. 
Thus, a tax program could be coupled with an education program such that 
those taxed would maintain their former level of drive reduction and the 
revenue applied to other government programs such as granting sdiolar-
ships to ^ etto residents. 
Since the benefits of the information to be gained would be in general 
unknown to the individual, there is no particular reason for him to be on 
his most efficient path a posteriori. In the United States today, society 
judges -vâiich relations are the true relations and then encourages a more 
rapid attainment of this informati<xi by a subsidy to education so that for 
the individual his a priori best path conforms to the social judgment. If 
in fact, after some time and a series of more or less random approaches 
to discovering the most believable aspects of the real world, the ind-
vidual would arrive at the same ccmclusions as he would by following a 
subsidized route then, unambiguously, there is a saving of social resources. 
Of course, the validity of such a statement is a moot question. The final 
analysis is that it remains a value judgment on the part of those with the 
power to decide lAether it saves resources or not lAen in fact the infor­
mation of each member of society is less than perfect. 
Since often the expenditure of resources on educational activities 
can influence morelhan a single person, the value of education would be 
slightly different than presented in equation 6 above. Let G = a group 
12^ 
of individuals that caa siraultatteously leam from the expenditure of 
fvâvUrees CO. sdxicsiiccsl sctivities^ 
e € jl, . . ., kT » the iadex of resources necessary to alter the 
® ^ knowledge set of individual g G» 
Then the costs to educate the entire group G would be 
4 
max \ L P&. / , 
' k ] 
and the value of education analogous to (6) for a group would be 
( a t  a s  -  " a :  f  •  
G O^S i€s J ® L^®g J 
Thus for an efficient use of resources, the size of the group, G should 
be expanded until the marginal cost of educating the last individual is 
equal to the savings of resources due to the changed knowledge set for 
that last individual. Or, if g. = the marginal individual, idaere 
or the marginal saving is equal to the marginal cost. The above argument 
holds in either the static sense or the dynaaic sense. In the static sense, 
current drive reduction from a given knowledge set is compared to the 
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savings ia resources vlth eua expaoded knowledge set to attain th.e fozmer 
level of driye- r^uction. Ia the dyaaoilc sense* the above argues that the 
maximum drive reduction available from education, by using the increased 
available resources, should be evaluated for each individual in terms of 
the savings in resources ^ Aiich would result if this same higher level of 
drive reduction were to be achieved without changing the individuals 
knowledge set but by increasing his wagie rate or simply, subsidies of any 
form, (it should be clearly understood that boththe level of drive reduc-
ti(m attainable from the given knowledge set and that from the altered 
knowledge set are chosen by the individual of his own choice.) Then 
expenditures on education should be increased as loag as the marginal 
costs are less than the savings to the marginal individual. 
This criterion of efficiency does not answer the ethical or social 
welfare problem lAich is likely to arise in such a situation. For example 
suppose that the marginal social saving in resource (i.e., the savings in 
resources for the last individual educated) is equal for each member of 
the society or group; but, the marginal cost of educating or altering the 
knowledge set of individuals is increasing sts shown in Figure 5.6. 
Then lAich members of the total group should be included in those 
educated, og*. Figure 5*6, and those not educated, g*gmax? Clearly, any 
one individual could just as well be in the benefited group og* as not. 
In addition, the above analysis is a partial equilibrium analysis. That 
is, although the activities are sufficiently general to include the drive 
reduction from associating with informed people, this is not explicitly 
considered in a general equilibrium frameworic. If drive reduction were in­
creased for each individual as others were informed, then more resources 
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t 
Saving* 
Ù r* gtnvc. 
Fig. 5.6. Marginal social costs and marginal social savings of 
education. 
should be applied to education than criterion (8) implies and less if 
drive reducticxi were reduced by educating one's associates. Since imple­
mentation of the static criterion results in a savings in resources which 
can be further utilized by society, the argument in the general sense is 
one of the use to lAich additional resources should be put, not a real­
location of current resource use. That is, it is an argument of the direc­
tion of change for a progressing economy not an efficiency criterion for 
a static economy. How to best utilize the fruits of increased produc­
tivity—through wage increases or changes in the knowledge set—is the 
point of this analysis. 
A similar analysis can be given for advertising and other forms of 
persuasion cm the part of business firms. In this case, as opposed to the 
goals of society as a whole, the goals can be more clearly defined, namely 
greater profits. Obviously advertising, in terms of the model developed 
here, represents a capital expenditure on the part of the firm and the rate 
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of depreciation depends upon the extent that an altered preference for 
its product or products is affected by other forms of advertising as well 
as the effects of other information on the individual. 
The optimal amount of advertising carried out by the individual firm 
will be an amount such that the marginal expense of advertising is just 
equal to the marginal revenue from advertising, which is a necessary con­
dition if the firm maximizes: 
/X.t 
\rfiere: 'ft = production profits (i.e., total revenuse minus production 
costs) 
x^ . = advertising at time t 
x,i; 
p^ ^  = price of a unit of x^, at time t discounted to t = 0. 
+ depends upon the cumulative effect of past advertising on quan-
yt 
tity sold, i.e., q, depends upcm / x_ .dt = resources used in adver-
x , t  ^  i f t  
tising ir the past. 
Any further particular analysis will depend upon the specific market 
structure, Hie composition of the consumers, as well as a host of other 
aspects of the situation. 
As an example of the evaluation of advertising the following model will 
be explained and the conclusion is that a single firm is better than two.^ 
Of coarse such a model is not difficult to generate. For exastple, 
if the equilibrium quantities of goods sold by two firms after advertising 
is the same as that before, and if advertising adds nothing to the satis­
faction of the ccmsumers, then advertising amounts to a waste of resources. 
Model 5-2 is somei&at more geneiral in that it allows for information to be 
a function of advertising. 
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Model ^.2 
Assume: 
1. 2 firms producing output aad q^, respectively. 
2. h groups of consumers, C = («g» 
3. a. a advertising; activity undertaken by firm i. 
b. a V!-(l . X, ) per period time is the only feasbble way to 
^ advertise. 
4. *2 ~ consumptive activity ext. the part of consumers, 
if Wg = then the individual will use of firm I's output. 
if Wg = X^(qg) then the individual will use of fiim 2*s output. 
5. The decision criterion, P^, is the same for each consumer. 
6. For consumer group initially, 
T. For group C^, initially, 
8. For group C^, initially, 
a. > i.e., won't buy either or g_ without more 
information 
b. if w^ = V^(l.x^) then, the eaqierience probability with respect to 
P(E/J(^l(qj^)), for group is equal 
c. if w^ = V^(l.x^) then P{E) with respect to {^(q^) is equal to 
d. the PQl^-) (g-, )) is > P^ if a^ units of are used for a^ periods 
of time by firm 1. 
e. the P(jC^(q^)) is > P^ if + b^ units of are used for a^ +J^ 
units of time by firm 2, in the absence of advertising by firm 1. 
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9. For group initially, 
~ ^ ^û7 i.e., wa'i, wujr vivw? q, or «ors 
b. if then P(E) is equivalent tOyff^ vitb respect to 
Î^Cq^) 
c. if then P(B) is equivalent toyf€^ with respect to 
d. the if units of are used by firm 2 for a^ 
units of time. 
e. the P(V^^(q^)) > P^ if a^ + units of are used by firm 1 
for a^ + units of time, in the absence of advertising by 
firm 2. 
10. For each consumer if P(îf^^(q^)) > PCX^jCqj)) and > P^, then he will 
purchase one unit of commodity q^. That is, each individual's cal­
culus is such that if either . ( q. ) is sufficiently believed, the one 
with the greatest amount of belief will be included in the calculus 
process and the result will be a point demand for one unit of q per 
unit of time at a price p^. If the price rises danand will fall to 
zero, if price falls, only one unit per unit of time per person will 
be demanded. This is illustrated in Figure 5'7-
11. The form of advertising has no direct effect on drive reduction for 
any member of any group. That is, advertising, per se, is neither 
enjoyable or irritating. 
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Pi 
Hi/tinit of 
Fig. 5.7« Demand by a single consumer for commodity g. if (q,)) 
>v 
Model 5,2, Case 1 
Two firms in the market 
Initially, firm 1 sells units of q^, i.e., one unit to each member 
of C^, while firm 2 sells units of q^. 
Assume that if both fizms advertise fizia 1 will be able to sell 
additional quantities of to group 0^ while firm 2 will be able to sway 
group to his product and as long as both continue to advertise per 
period of time each will maintainiiiis share: firm I's share = + C^; 
fizm 2's share = Cg + C^. Also assume that the marginal production cost 
for both firms is equal and constant. Further it is also assumed that it 
is profitable to convince groups and by firms 1 and 2, respectively, 
or that: 
OO 
and 
00 
z (OgP 
t=l qt -
^Aere: 
q^ = C^, if 0 < t < a^ 
q^ = + Cj, if a^ < t 
Qg - ^ 2' 0 < t < a^ 
Qg = Gg + Cj^, if a^ < t 
1)1 
Tikere A. = m.arg,iaal productioa cost at time t > 0 discounted to t « 0 and 
t 
PT-o- g<-> ^igçojinted to t = O. Biea the use Of resources to 
supply 0^ + 0^ + 0^+ units of q for all time is equal to 
* PaA>' if «1 " 
Model 5.2, Case 2 
One firm in the market 
Assume that firm 1 can win over all four consumer groups if sufficient 
advertising is carried out. Further, assume that it is profitable to do so. 
i.e. 
K 
tAiere q^ = if 0 < t < a^, 
q^j^ = Ci + C^, if < t < ai + b^, 
qi = Ci + if < t < + c^, 
^1 = + Cg + if a^ + + c^ < t, and 
R = a^ + b^ + c^. 
Use of resources here is 
i,V-2-JoVA • 
Thus a monopoly will be more efficient than a two-firm oligopoly with con­
stant marginal costs (and ignoring the fact that the monopoly takes a 
longer time to convince all consumers, + Cj^ in this model) if 
/
CO _ CO  ^  ^  ^
+ 2p t^^ ^)dt A^qdt + ^  Pit^ ^dt 
vhere again the prices are discounted to t = 0 and q^ refers to the output 
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of two firms at time t and ^  refers to the output of the single monopolist 
Since 
^ ^ * 2 ^  + f A^-^dt 4. a 
00 
,dt. / 
and 
CO _ .N Y.N -CO 
^ Ati^dt 4. ^  ^ A^q^dt + y A^q^dt * ^  
and t > N implies that = q^, 
tnen monopoly will be more efficient if: 
-N _ N 
/ A^qtdt + ^  *Z J ^ a^^dt 
Since we have assumed away the effects of not fulfilling total con­
sumer demand as quickly by monopoly as by two-firm oligopoly, it can also 
K 
resources are be assumed that ^  A^q^dt = ^  A^g^dt so that the lost 
a" 
essentially the duplication in advertising J  p^^x^dt + 2  j  p^^x^dt. 
Another example of the evaluational potential of models of individual 
behavior lAich are free of the restrictions of a given knowledge and prod­
uct set is-the following analysis of a change in the product set. 
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Model 3.5 
Assume iaitially there are 5 cocmodittes eaad, 3 activities, and 
*1' *2' ^ 3* vh&re x^ are laboring and labor. From the feasible set 
for eaeh individual, oabc,, assume a maximizing solution along ca in Figure 
5.s or c'a' in. Figure 5.9> such that the quantity sold is x^ and x^ for 
individual i. 
Fig. 5-9* Maximizing solution 
for a consumer -when 
three commodities are 
available. 
Fig. 5.8. Feasible set for a consumer. 
Assume that we have CHie firm supplying both x_ and x, and the quan-
^ ^ i i tity sold of each is Z x^ and Z x, . If C(Zx, = cost of producing Zx,, 
i=l i=l ^  i 
then the initial profit isf^* = Px^ - C(Zx^) + Px^ Zx^ - C(Zx^). 
1 i i 1 
** 
Suppose that the firm is able to lower the price of x^ to ?x^ and 
concomitantly eliminate x^ from the market so that the profit level, IT**, 
is hi^er, i.e., 
fi-** >'n-* 
** ^ **i , ® **iv 
where tT** = Z x. - C( Z x. ). 
i=l x«l 
The feasible set for each consumer shifts from oabc. Figure >.6, to oa"o 
and the change in price of x^ is represented by a shift in the budget 
restriction from M < 0 to M ' < 0. 
The quantity sold for each individual is shown in Figure 5.10 as 
oa* ' * or 2^ and it is assumed to be at a lower level of drive reduction 
< = the initial solution. 
Fig. $.10. Change in consumer demand for when x, is removed 
from the market. 
"3t "îHt 
Suppose that the total revenue of selling x^ and x^ is the same and 
letting = profit from selling x^, then tT** > TT* if 
C( Z ^  < C(5^h - TTx! . 
i=l ^ 
Thus, given sufficient economics of scale the firm would reduce the choice 
of products, thus increasing its profits and lowering the drive reduction 
of each consumer. 
1)5 
Model 5.5 is the essence of the argument by ScitovsJsy (1962) and 
otners as to the absence of coasuaef soverei^ty and the lowering of 
satisfaction to consumers with the advent of mass production techniques. 
Model 5.5 is indeed extreae^ but even so, the gain to the stockholders 
and/or managers of the firm cannot be judged against the loss to consumers. 
Relaxing the assumptions of Model 5.3 to allow a more competitive market 
structure, it is clear that a sufficient number of consumers must prefer 
the reduction in choice with the lowered price level of the mass produced 
item to completely eliminate the additional product, (the relative number 
benefited verses those made worse off depends uptm the economics of scale 
associated with the two goods). Disregarding the effects cxi firms, the 
ccaasumers can be classified into two groups, viz., (l) those better off 
after a change in the product set (as pictured in Figure 5.II), and (2) 
those worse off (Figure ^.10). 
a* 
Pig. 5» 11- Consumer 160 is benefited by reduced product set. 
Without a social welfare function, or a method of aggregating over individ­
uals, the change in the product set cannot be evaluated. 
136 
Tbe models developed here free economic aaalysis of its restrictions 
to s!2sl^z^ ^ ly commodities and this expansion to the ouch more general 
concept of activities, permits theoretical inquiry into essentially every 
area of personal and social interaction* The examples touched upon here­
tofore are only a sampling, of the multifarious applications to relevant 
aspects of human behavior vhich are possible within such an expanded 
matrix. 
1)7 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II 
The substantial amount of literature oa choice under uncerlaiwty la 
primarily consequent upon the work of von Neum,ann-Morgenstern (1955) but 
vhose origins begin with Ramsey (1951) and Bernoulli (1954). This liter­
ature which deals with choice i6en outcomes are subject to random events 
has been omitted from the main body as it represents a further complica­
tion to any decisicxi process. In Chapter IV the individual is assumed 
to be searching for the correct relations between products and activities 
and between activities and drives. Such relations are assumed to exist 
but are not known with certainty. The inclusion of activities whose out­
come is variable ^ en the actual relations are known would represent a 
further extension of the models developed. For example, in tossing a 
fair coin, establishing the correct relation would entail learning that 
the probability was equal to (me-hauLf, tdiereas in Chapters IV and V it is 
assumed that the correct relations yield deterministic results. 
In algebraic choice systems under uncertainty, the criterion of 
Bernoulli and also that adopted by von Neumann-Morgenstem is that the in­
dividual maximizes expected utility. That is, for any option open to the 
individual there are a series of possible outcomes. The expectation of 
option A is greater than option B assuming a finite number of outcomes, if 
Pi^A. > 
11 1 
where p^ is either the subjective probability or the objective probability 
of relative frequency and where U. , U_ are the utilities associated with 
*i 1 
outcome i under options A and B respectively. 
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The von Keumaan-Morgenstem approach is to assume that ntmerical 
probability is equivalent to subjective probability and farther that the 
probability of the even and the utility of the event are independent. 
The axioms necessary for a slightly more general model are due to Herstein 
and Milnor (1955) and are as follows: 
Assume A = set of possible outcomes and there exists a binstry rela­
tion on the set A,^ = "preferred or indifferent to." 
> = "preferred to" =» ^  and not ^  
^ = "indifferent to" = > and ^  
If the following axioms of choice are satisfied for any x, y, a A 
ard p, qctO,l3: 
1. > = a weak ordering of A 
2. aqpy € A 
5- xpy = y(l-p)x 
(3q>y)qy = xpqy 
5. xly = x 
6. x-ys^Cx^z)-^ (^z) 
7. £p|3Q)y > zj , [p| z ^  xpy] are closed 
Under these axioms of choice the following theorra can be proven; 
There exists a linear, order-preserving functicm u:(A, j^)—•R and u is 
unique up to a positive linear transformation.^ 
This result then allows for utility to be measured by a difference 
scale which is unique. By arbitrarily setting the u(x) = 1, u(z) = 0, 
u(y) = p, where x^ y ^  z and y^xpz, a scale of utility can be determined. 
^or detailed proof see Herstein-Milnor (1955) or Luce and Suppes in 
Luce, Bush, and Galanter (196$), pp. 284-291. 
IW 
It is worth, noting that serious questions can be rstised with respect 
to the various assumptions employed. Namely, the independence of proba­
bility and outcome would imply, for instance, that an, individual would be 
indifferent between winning equsû. pots in a poker game with four aces and 
winning with a pair of deuces. Secondly, the equating of numerical prob­
ability or relative frequency of an infinite number of repetitions with 
the subjective probability has been subject to much criticism. This dis-
SLIIOWS such things as hunches and intuitive feels for particular outcomes. 
Perhaps this assumption is a normative one for "better" choice^ but it 
does not necessarily explain and predict human behavior. In addition, 
the criterion of expected value has no a priori validity. It seems rea­
sonable that situations would arise where the various other moments of 
tae distribution, e.g., variance, skewness, etc., would be relevant to 
1 the final decision. 
Clearly axiom 6, as well as the statement of tiae following theorem, 
imply that tne utility function is separable and additive or that 
= 0- The seven axioms on page 1^7 place no particular restriction on the 
interpretation of the p's. If tte p's are not interpreted as probabil­
ities but as linear combinations of commodity bundles, tnen although the 
derived measure is unique it does not measure utility but merely measures 
commodities. Thus, if the approach is going to measure utility, the p's 
need to be interpreted as creating gambling choices. 
This von Ifeumann-Morgenstem, (N-M), approach is a subtle but signif­
icant departure from the utility analysis under the traditional ordinal 
^or extensive reviews of similar ideas see especially Luce and 
Rstiffa (1957) and Raiffa and Schlaifer (I968). 
149 
preference ordering, axioms. The analysis restricts choice to comparison 
of uncertain events aad as such ia a theory of choice amwg probal^ility 
distributions and associated random variables. In other words, there is 
a change in the choice set. The N-M axioms assert that if ^  then 
y is indifferent to some probabilistic combination of x and 2. However, 
the probable combination of x and z necessary to be equal to y would 
depend upon the number of times the choice was going to be made. In 
other words, the choice between a one-time lottery ticket and a situation 
%Aiere the lottery ticket can be purchased an infinite number of times 
would in general make some difference to the individual. To this aspect 
the N-M axioms make no reference. In essence, the N-M ^proach purpoi-ts 
to measure utility of preferences over commodities when it is actuadly 
measuring preferences of gambling events. Graphically this means that 
Figures 2.2a and 2.3a could both be compatible with Figure 2.1a, yet the 
numerical value assigned to the U's in Figure 2.2a are not equivalent to 
those assigned in Figure 2.5a. 
Other unsuccessful attempts to measure utility have also been tried 
from a somewhat different approach.^ The argument is the following: 
Since max. U subject to ZP.x. = M results in = XP. as a first-
order condition, then if the U function is separable, = 0 under a 
system of changed prices and changed income levels such that the quan­
tity of X purchased is the same in both, one should be able to measure the 
marginal utility of inccme up to a linear transformation, i.e., 
Let x = quantity purchased under P, M and P, M and K = marginsLl 
^See Fellner, et al., (1967)-
... 
4 
This implication is that \ is the margined utility o f  money. How­
ever, tiiis Is true czily if tbf «^t of obtaining creates neither utility or 
disutility. As demonstrated in Cheq^ter III and the Appendix to Chapter 
III, \ more precisely represents the marginal value of real balances. 
Thus, if one were analyzing aristocrats who regularly clipped bond cou­
pons with no effort, the analysis would be accurate. However, for the 
majority of society, the Lagrangean multiplier represents the marginal 
value of altering a constraint impinging upon their activities, such as 
market credit conditions as developed in Chapter III. 
The immediate alternative approach to choice under uncertainty is to 
measure subjective probability first. Ramsey (1951) suggested that by 
finding a chance event with subjective probability of one-half, one could 
use this to c(«struct the utility function. Finally use the utility func­
tion to meeisure subjective probability. Extensive work with this partic­
ular approach nas been done by Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel (3957), David­
son and Suppes (1956), and Suppes and Winet (1955), among others. 
A theoretic approach to probability without consideration of utility 
originated with DePinetti (1957)^ and has been expanded by Savage (195^)-
Scott (1964) presents a more up-to-date and generalized analysis. 
The sçjplxcsticKi of utility under uncertain outcomes to theories of 
choice is an immediate step from the von Neumann-Morgenstem treatise and 
of coarse is included under their Theory of Games. %e objection with 
this is that «gain there is no particular reason why one should maximize 
expected utility as opposed to the various other proposed criteria e.g., 
"regret" by Savage (1951), "sstisficing" by Simon (l95b, 1956), or 
"hteprinted in Kyburg and Smokier (1964) with other similar articles. 
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"poteatial surprise" by Shackle (1955)»^ The problem which arises in a 
con.5t^.t-suni £fiune and vhicn is intensified ia a nonzero^suia gaae (ex^-= 
plified) by the "prisoner's dilemma") is twofold: (l) the relevancy of 
tue various moments of the distributed utility outcom,e and (2) the assumed 
strategy employed by the opponent. Indeed, these aspects plus the virtual 
infinity of strategies avadlaible in a real world situation and the associ­
ated lack of knowledge has dealt a severe blov to the promising applica­
bility and usefulness that game theory held at one time. 
An entirely different approetch which has resulted in a great deal of 
tùeoretical verbiage and experimental application is that of the general 
probabilistic choice theories. These can be summer!zed by the following 
general model: 
Given that a person is in state A at time t^, there exist probabil­
ities P and 1-Pf such that at time t^+l he will be in state B with a 
probability of P, or he will be in state C with a probability of 1-P. 
Since "the principle behind this is to assume that the response of an indi­
vidual is governed by a probability, which is quite useful for psycholog­
ical experimentation but which essentially rejects the personal calculus 
approach, only slight mention of the various sources will be given here. 
Probabilistic choice theories can be separated into constant utility 
models, random utility models, probabilistic ranking theory, and proba­
bilistic choice under uncertainty. For a review see Luce and Suppes in 
Luce, Bush, and Galanter, (1965) and Luce (1959)• 
^or a detailed rewiew see Luce and Raiffa (1957) or Thrall, Coombs, 
and Davis (1954). Also see Fellner (1965) for a survey and unique approach 
to choice under uncertainty. 
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APPENDIX TO CliAPm III 
Model 5«2 
I. (l) Max: S * 0(v^, , 
(2) *'*' ^ ~ ^ 
subject to: 
C3) < «0 
1=1 
(^) "'f —^0 
(5) x^, > 0^ i — If •••> j — •••> ^ ~ If •• 
I is equivalent to II 
II. (1) Max. S = 0*(xj^, « « f 1' "**' g) 
subject to: 
(2) CT.Xj < Mg 
(5) /*(*!» •••' V •••'Hl^-^0 
Assuming a regular constrained maximum exists, then the solution 
occurs on the boundary of the constraints, and the inequalities in II.2 
II.5 become equalities. The first-order conditions are 
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Suppose that there is a paraijietric change in the above model in the 
budget or credit constraint condition dM^. Differentiating III.l with 
respect to and dropping the superscripts one obtains: \J 
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Letting -\J .  = 0. . and v \ = T. . and differentiating all 
W Q X j W ^j it) 
eguaticms in III with respect to and writing the resulting system of 
k+nH-2 equations in matrix form system V results: 
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Solving by Cramer's rule, 
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w 
(5) = (.l)j+2k+M2 
where |0|is the determinate of and |0^j  is the determinate 
of the cofactor matrix of £0 J . 
To simplify the notation, let 0. . = 0. . - X._T. . and r = k + m. Solv-ij ij 2 ij 
ing for a change in the time constraint T^, dTg, system VI is obtained 
similar to V. 
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or M [e] . [0j in V. 
Solving VI. 1: 
(2) ( \i+r+)l^+&il 
I el 
(J) ^ 
Then by adding V.l and VI.1, 
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The result of a price change cao be similarly derived, i.e., dP^ > 0, 
rsstilts ri-2 eqtistioos S5 çbown in VIII. 1. 
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Solving VIII. 1: 
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The foregoing analysis can be alternatively viewed in the following manner 
Define Pw. = price of an activity which is a functicai, in general, of 
the levels of activities undertaken 
IX. (1) Pw^ = Pw^(w^, w^) 
Then 
1!>9 
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gives the lagraogean equation: 
(5) \ = 0(w^, ...,«J^) - Xj^CSPw^ w^) + XgCTg -f'Cv^, ...,éi»^)). 
The 1st order conditions are: 
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(5) = -J^ - >^2 < 0, i - 1, ..., m. 
Assuming the equality holds, then dPw^ results in; __ 
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Similarly a parametric change in the budget and time constraints would 
yield (9) and (lO), respectively. 
(9) "î^ - (-1)"''^® 'V"'' • 
(10) 4^ . 
As discussed in the text, a change in the knowledge set can manifest 
itself as equivalent to a change in the parameters of the model. This can 
be as any three of those discussed above or as a change in the functional 
form of If the functional change can be approximated by 
a small change in the first partiels of evaluated at max. S, then 
d ^  > 0 results in the following effects. 
Let; d ^  ^ the analogous system of equations to IX. 5 
is given by X.l. 
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Solving X.l, X.4 is the substitution effect on activity j due to a change 
in the marginal time use of activity i. 
(iv) ^^3 _ (_i)j+r+2 ^^r+2,j\ 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV 
In this appendix a more detailed analysis of the statistical proper­
ties of Bayesian probability theory and estimation techniques are examined. 
This synopsis of the relevsint statistical literature can be found in 
further detail elsewhere.^ 
If one defines a simple sample as one ge^ierated from a binomial dis­
tribution, then probability of any sequence of r successes and s failures 
out of N trials, r + s =» K, is 
(1) pf(l-p)G. 
If p is unknown, it can be considered as a sample from a super-popula­
tion with its own density functicai f(x) and cumulative density function 
F(X), i.e., P(p<x) = F(X). Then for each sequence of sample size K with 
r successes and s failures, the probability of each sequence is: 
(2) f x^(l-x)®dF(x). ^  
^0 
Thus the probability of r successes and s failures, P(r,s), would be 
(3) P(r,s) = (5x^(l-x)®dF(x) 
n; N: 
(r) = rj{N-r); = wiT ' 
^See especially Good (1965) and the references cited therein and 
Raiffa and Schlaifer (I968). 
^If the binary process is permutable (the probabilities are inde­
pendent of the sequence), then any outcome of (r,s) can be expressed in 
this form and furthermore, F(p) is unique. For a detailed proof of this 
see DeFinetti (1957) or Good (1965). 
io3 
The question is: What is the aature of the super-population density 
function, f(p)? Bayes' postulate -was wat r(p) = 1, snd F(p) -
was used in Chapter IV as a condition of ignorance. 
If F(X) - X, then dF(x) = f(x)dx » dx; then the probability of r 
successes and s failures becomes: 
and therefore the expected value of p under the Bayes postulate is r+l/N+2 
by Laplace ' s rule of succession or as shown in Chapter IV. 
Since the Bayes postulate is quite restrictive in that it does not 
allow the use of prior information other than that implied by our inter­
pretation of perfect ignorance, other forms for f(p) have been promulgated. 
Specifically, Hardy and Lidstone (EL)^ postulated that f{p) be a Beta 
function with parameters «, 3, i.e., f(p) = p'^(l-p)^, « > -1, ^  > -1. 
Since dF(p) = f(p)dp, the expected value of p after r successes and s 
failures under the HL postulate Is: 
Clearly this amounts to adding œ successes and 0 failures to the observed 
successes and failures (r,s). For example, oc and ^ could be generated by 
an "imaginary" experiment- This amounts to a subjective alteration of the 
probability estimaticm processes. 
0 
p^^(l-p)®f(p)dp 
(5 )  
^See Hardy (19^9) and Lidstone (1920). 
Suppose that oae wants to estimate the value of p. Then by familiar 
maxiiius. likslihccd techniques (wl) the estimate would be r/K. Kowe/er^, 
for an analysis of individual behavior, and especially when the sample 
size N is small, this estimator is clearly unsatisfactory. Suppose that 
r a N, then the ML estimate of p would be 1. Yet one can easily give 
examples where individuals would not act in this manner, i.e., assign com­
plete certainty of success to future samples. 
While use of parameters such as « and 3 is somewhat arbitreiry, it 
ao more so than that use of ML estimator wich implicitly uses a super-
population density function of p ^{l-p) i.e., « = -1, ^  = -1. 
However, distinction between the degree of subjectivity in altering 
estimation techniques is really not relevant to Chapter IV, in'general, 
since even the assigning of observed successes and failures was analyzed 
as being a subjective process on the part of the individual. 
Biis entire approach with a binomial distribution can be generalized 
to a multinomial distribution as demonstrated in Good (1965)- In a multi­
nomial sample, there are t categories (or characteristics or classifi-
t 
cations) with probabilities p_. such that Z p. = 1. If n. is the frequency 
^ t 1=1 ^  ^ 
of category i in the sample N (i.e.. En. = K = sample size), then the 
i=l ^  
probability of such a sequence is: 
(6) Pi^ . Pg^ . ... 
ràicxi is the generalization of equation 1. Again, if the p^'s are unknown 
the generalization of equation 2 for the probability of such a sequence is: 
n n t-1 n 
(7) J ^ .. .  p^_^ (1 - ' 9t-l^ 
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The natural geaeralizatioa of the Bayes postulate is to assume 
is >2?>>-form in the simplex " 1. analogous expec^ 
ted value of then, is: 
_ a.+l 
^i " SÎt" ' 
compared to the ML estimate of p: 
(9) 
Similarly, the implementation of a more general super-populatiwi 
density function for the p^'s is the Dirichlet di stribet I on with parameters 
k., i ~ 1, •••, t* 
^ k. 
(lO) P(Ek.) IT.) 7, \ \ = Dirichlet distribution. 
This can easily be shown to be equivalent to a Beta distribution if t = 2, 
i.e.. 
)TrPi Av (U) r(z.„)Tr{^u v^a.p,v^ 
Since = B(k_, k ) = Beta distribution, equation 11 becomes: 
V^(i-p)V^ "r^Ci-pjV^ 
or equaticHi 12 is equal to p'^(l-p)^ where oc = 2k^ - 1, P = 2kg - 1. 
Therefore the estimate for p. becomes: 
• 1 
(3") Pi BN-k^t 
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Clearly the generalization of the Bayes postulate implies that = 1» 
'^hile the ML ç^stîmation implies that = 0» la any case the value of 
each is a subjective value depending upon the individual^ the essence 
of others' information, and the specific problem.^ 
The implications of the above generalization of the binomial probabil­
ity distribution relieve many of the "interpretative" aspects of the specietl 
analysis of Ch8ç>ter IV but do not change the essence of the simplified argu­
ment. 
With the multinomial approach, one can view the individual as parti­
tioning an activity into several characteristics or categories and from 
past experience, assigning a number of successes to each category. Again 
the only important aspect of the assigning of successes, n^, to each cate­
gory is their relativity. N = Zn^ -would be interpreted as the intensity 
of the actual, observed experia2.ce and the k^'s as resulting firom imagined 
experiences such as those from advertising and the like. 
The estimation procedure and the changing of the knowledge set as 
developed in Chapter IV would be essentieùLly unchanged. The difference, 
of course, would be the Jointness of the multinomial distribution to esti­
mating arbitrary categories of the activities carried out and/or imagined. 
Note, however, that the modificaticm to the estimation procedure as shown 
in equatiCHi 13 is sli^t, but dependent upon the number of categories. This 
is turn would alter the specific analysis of special cases such as the quan­
tity of advertising necessary to "alter" preferences, for example. However, 
^Jeffreys (I961) suggested k = 1/2, lAile Perks (19^7) advocated k = 
l/t. While each have some merits, neither is sufficiently general for all 
situations. 
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the more general analysis of Cases 1.1 and 1.2 In Ohag^ter IV, wbere^^^s, 
(P(E./ (x_)) » jot^X are assigaedi by aay method remain» unchanged. J » X 
